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ABSTRACT 
 
The European markets for natural gas are characterized by a dual pricing structure 
which reflects the continents very significant import dependence: the price of imports 
fluctuates following different dynamics than the price determined by the domestic markets’ 
supply/demand balance. This thesis researches the reasons for this price duality and questions 
the sustainability and desirability of such a hybrid pricing structure in the future. The time 
frame varies between a short-term period (defined as roughly 3 years) to a long-term period 
(roughly 10 years). 
To answer the research question, the distribution of reserves, consumption and 
production as well as their historical development have to be analyzed to determine the 
emergence of possible new trends as well as the market power of the main exporters. 
Considering security of supply, geopolitical dimensions are also taken into account, namely 
the EU’s energy policy and import diversification strategy. Finally, the paper focuses on the 
emergence of domestic markets within the context defined previously, with a particular 
attention towards these markets’ role in comparison to the bulk of the volumes imported 
under long-term sales arrangements. 
The result of the above analyses is a framework for describing the evolution of the 
European markets within a globalizing context. Such framework allows discussing the 
potential development of EU natural gas hubs according to 7 variables as mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive as possible given the vastness of the matter and the 
interconnection between the different elements at hand. It aims therefore at being used as a 
map to follow the evolution of the growth of gas hubs within the considerably uncertain 
environment they are evolving in. Such framework also highlights how the complete 
preponderance of one pricing mechanism (hub versus long-term contracts) is more likely to 
happen over the medium to long term rather than the short term. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s energy outlook is characterized by important challenges of a depth, importance 
and urgency that had not been witnessed in decades. First and foremost, the world still relies 
heavily on fossil fuels, whose usage entails well-known and ever more apparent undesirable 
effects on climate. Secondly, important technological advances are expanding the availability 
of energy sources to the market: oil and natural gas production is increasing rapidly due to 
technological innovations allowing the extraction of so-called “unconventional” reserves; 
technological advances are also reducing the reliance on subsidies and bringing closer to the 
market renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, while clean coal technologies 
could potentially allow to reduce the ecological impact of one of the most polluting sources of 
energy. Thirdly, following the disaster of Fukushima in Japan in March 2011, the role of 
nuclear power is questioned; Germany, for example, decided in the immediate aftermath of 
the tragic event to reduce its nuclear capacity by 8 GW. Also, the energy industry is faced by 
the continuous challenge of liberalization and deregulation; in this respect, the global picture 
varies considerably: competition among suppliers and transmission unbundling has been 
achieved in North America and the UK, is developing in Europe (albeit at a slow pace) and at 
an embryonic stage in Asia (broadly speaking). Certainly, but this is not a novel element, the 
energy resources are also faced with a challenge in terms of unprecedented growth in 
population and economic activity, which makes the need for efficiency ever more pressing. 
Finally, globalization acts as a blending force multiplying and catalyzing the interactions 
between the previous elements. 
Within this global picture, Europe, with its high import dependence, its climatic targets 
and its progress towards liberalization, represents a challenging arena. In particular, natural 
gas (as well as renewable energy) has grown significantly within Europe’s primary energy 
consumption, at the expense of crude oil & petroleum products, solid fuels (such as coal), and 
nuclear energy. Natural gas is also the cleanest among fossil fuels. It is conveyed to the end 
users via an elaborate mix of transport infrastructure, which range from transnational 
pipelines to LNG cargoes and regasification terminals. Roughly two thirds of Europe’s 
natural gas consumption is imported, while one third is produced domestically. The gas 
businesses in the EU are structured in a portfolio of long-term contracts and wholesale trading 
points, commonly referred to as trading hubs, to price the gas and to optimize the different 
risk exposures. Such structure is commonly referred to as hybrid pricing model.  
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While natural gas is increasing in importance within Europe’s energy mix, the domestic 
reserves become increasingly depleted; as a consequence, European natural consumption has 
to look for renewed sourcing abroad. Europe therefore becomes, by its size and internal 
dynamics, a central player in the globalization process of the natural gas market. Within such 
evolving picture, the European Union considers the creation of an efficient and flexible 
internal market the main response to the challenges and uncertainties to which such 
globalization process is exposing the Union’s energy mix, most importantly global warming 
and security of supply.  
1.1. Problem Statement and Research Question 
The aim of this paper is to offer an understanding of the dynamics affecting the supply 
and demand sides of the natural gas market, with a particular focus on Europe. In particular, 
the thesis investigates the delicate balance of risks that had been regulated via the 
establishment of long term supply contracts between the European countries and their main 
gas exporters. These import contracts guarantee security of supply to purchasers while 
balancing price risk with volume risk: the seller is exposed to price risk as such price is 
indexed to a commodity, usually oil, outside of his control; also, the seller is not exposed to 
volume risk since long-term import contracts have take or pay clauses, which stipulate that a 
certain minimum amount of gas deliveries will have to be withdrawn and, even if not 
withdrawn, paid for. As the European natural gas market faces globalization and its important 
dynamics, an increasing need for flexibility and adaptability to evolving supply and demand 
conditions arises. Such need is in contrast with the rigid conditions stipulated in long-term 
contractual import agreements. Hence, the main research question of this thesis concerns the 
consequences of liberalizing EU’s gas markets, both in terms of security of supply and 
pricing.  
The problem statement of this thesis can therefore be summarized as follows: 
Is there a trade-off for Europe between natural gas market liberalization and security of 
supply? Ultimately, are long-term import contracts undesirable, and is the actual hybrid 
pricing model destined to disappear? 
Another way of phrasing such problem statement would be to ask whether the gas market 
liberalization implies a weakening of Europe’s position within the international competition 
for the resource; in other words, one could ask whether gas liberalization is likely to force 
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Europe to “pay more” for security of supply. In fact, as discussed above, an important 
underlying trend of such market is the profound influence of globalization (i.e. free flows of 
capital and people balancing differences and a generating a convergence in GDP levels across 
countries). From this descend other important considerations, such as an evaluation of the 
benefits of deregulation, liberalization and economic efficiency, as well as an assessment of 
the possible role of natural gas as a solution to combat climate change. Such force, as for 
many other industries, appears to be a determining factor that will dominate the natural gas 
industry’s future development and characteristics. This could manifest itself mainly in the 
following forms: 
 Friction with the historical development of the market, including its geopolitical 
aspects 
 Supply-demand side interacting on a much vaster scale 
 Volatility of natural gas prices 
The frictions and interactions between two fundamental drivers are therefore the object of 
this thesis: increasing volatility deriving from the globalization of the industry, and the 
coexistence of two price levels, namely, the hub level as well as the long-term contract import 
price level. 
Additional questions can be useful to understand the line of reasoning followed by this 
thesis: 
1. How is natural gas positioned within the world energy balance? In particular, how are 
demand and supply centers distributed across the world and how is trade organized to 
balance such market? 
2. What is the distribution of the natural gas reserves across the world and what are the 
geopolitical implications of such distribution? 
3. What are the new trends affecting discoveries and supply? 
4. How is Europe endowed in reserves and what is the evolution of its 
consumption/production patterns? In particular, how is Europe’s natural gas supply 
evolving in terms of sourcing? How will Europe’s import dependency evolve? 
5. How is Europe’s sourcing of natural gas structured both internally (domestic market) 
and externally (import conditions)? What are the main characteristics of these two 
levels of supply and how are they evolving? 
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6. Finally, summing up all of the above: is the European gas market in a transition phase, 
or will two supply levels (i.e. the import market and the domestic market) coexist on 
the medium to long term? 
In the energy sector, as in most sectors in an economy, there are large differences in 
productivity across businesses. Furthermore, the process of productivity growth demands 
continuous resource reallocation (trial and error and adaptation to changes in the economic 
environment). However, by its nature such reallocation process across firms is costly 
(adjustment frictions, unemployment). Globalization, i.e. the opening up of markets and the 
reduction of trade barriers, is one of the main factors inducing reallocation. Even though, on 
the medium to long term, such process should allow for specialization in the sectors 
comparatively advantageous, the transition period can involve substantial dislocation of 
businesses and workers. Such considerations allow to highlight that many components need to 
be in place for economies to successfully grow while opening and liberalizing markets: labor 
markets need to be sufficiently flexible to permit the reallocation of workers while providing 
them with safety nets and assistance in such process; infrastructure needs to be of sufficient 
quality to avoid transportation and communication challenges; markets need to be sufficiently 
competitive to ensure that company growth is related to efficiency gains rather than market 
power; regulation has to provide oversight without imposing onerous costs; financial markets 
have to be able to manage the risk of contraction and exit. As long as such conditions are not 
in pace, open up market too fast can provide significant costs to an economy.  
The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse the interplay within the European natural gas 
industry of two apparently opposing forces: globalization, as a force towards competition, 
innovation and productivity, as opposed to security of supply, as a vector of stability achieved 
via long-term investments and contractual commitments. Globalization appears to be the 
underlying fundamental phenomenon catalyzing a process of creative destruction replacing 
large incumbent companies within the energy sector with new entrants who will justify their 
market share by a higher rate of productivity. However, the above considerations clearly 
illustrate the importance, particularly at a time of deep recession, of a gradual opening 
process. Furthermore, such considerations do not take into account security of supply and 
import dependency considerations, which are likely to further recommend caution.  
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1.2. Methodology 
This thesis collects empirical as well as theoretical literature on the evolution of the 
natural gas market globally, with a particular focus on Europe. Such topic is very vast, 
including matters such as the distribution of all natural resources across the globe, new 
technological discoveries expanding the production frontier, and different pricing mechanisms 
and contractual structures used to negotiate the delivery of natural gas to end-users and final 
consumers. To analyze the former set the data provided from the British Petroleum has been 
heavily relied upon, in that it allows to segment the information in a way that is convenient to 
the questions addressed by this research, and in particular to isolate the European Union and 
its main sources of supply (present and potentially future). Also, the US Energy Information 
Administration has been a very relevant source of information. To discuss the second set of 
arguments, i.e. aspects concerning contractual structures and pricing mechanisms (both on 
pipeline and LNG trade), this thesis has relied mostly on papers and research from the Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies as well as official organizations such as the International Gas 
Union.  
Also, key aspects of this issue, in that they affect the possible future demand/supply 
scenarios, are the geopolitical relevance of different areas (first and foremost the Middle East, 
followed by Russia) as well as the liberalization and pro-competition forces within the 
European Union. In particular, to set the framework for the latter point, official press releases 
from the EU Commission and the European Parliament have been used, as well as policy 
journals such as the European Energy Review.  
A vital part of this subject is finally the “live” evolution of matters such as, for example, 
new unconventional gas discoveries, the building of new infrastructure (pipelines, LNG 
terminals) resulting in a greater supply diversification and therefore competition between 
exporters, the evolution of disputes between exporters and importers, and the rulings of the 
European Union concerning antitrust measures against exporters or domestic incumbent 
importers. To this extent, professional journals and newsfeed have been used such as Reuters, 
Platts, Russia Today, The Economist and Forbes. 
1.3. The Structure of the Paper 
In order to tackle the research question, the paper has been organized around three main 
sections. The first sections deals with the place and role of natural gas within the world’s 
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energy balance, with a particular emphasis on the relevant factors for Europe (both 
economically and geopolitically). It firstly gives an idea of the increasing role of natural gas 
within the world’s primary energy supply as well as of the main players in the natural gas 
market; it then details the consumption and production centers to highlight the global 
imbalances and Europe’s import dependency. To such purpose, data from the British 
Petroleum 2011 Statistical Review of World Energy has been re-elaborated and grouped 
according to the relevant strategic dimensions in focus. A comparative picture of gas versus 
oil is also described, with the goal of introducing topics such as the potential creation of a gas 
OPEC and the dual pricing (oil-indexation versus hub-indexation) that will be discussed in the 
later sections. The consumption, production, and reserves distribution analysis also highlights 
the main global competition for supplies between Asia and Europe, with Asia promising 
tremendous growth and subjecting Europe to the risk of shortages. Finally, a specific focus is 
developed around two main issues which are likely to affect heavily the development and 
global interactions of natural gas supply and demand and which will then be used for the 
development of future scenarios: new unconventional gas resources and the growth of the 
LNG market. Unconventional gas is described both in terms of its (relatively) recent 
exploitation in the United States as well as its worldwide potential. The growth of the LNG 
market is detailed particularly in relation to its supply diversification potential, its arbitrage 
capability across the main price areas, and the development of a spot LNG market (as 
opposed to the dominant long-term contractual form). 
The second section transitions towards the gas market liberalization in Europe and the 
development of hub-pricing by presenting the geopolitical environment for natural gas. It 
starts with discussing the potential for a gas OPEC, particularly as a threat to EU gas 
liberalizations. Indeed, as the EU diversifies its supply mix and seeks lower prices via 
competition, it might submit itself to the risk of an oligopolistic response from a cartel of gas 
producers. The EU’s diversification is then illustrated, with a particular attention to the routes 
via Ukraine and Byelorussia and Russia’s key role when taking into account the increasing 
competition from Asia. To start crossing the dimensions so far illustrated, four scenarios are 
developed for the future of the supply/demand balance of natural gas, based on the progress of 
liberalization and unconventional gas exploitation. Such scenarios create a framework within 
which natural gas’ specific dynamics (liberalization and resource growth) can be studied in 
relation to the geopolitical context in which such resource evolves, which are of outmost 
importance in determining the success or failure of a gas market globalization. Finally, this 
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section concludes by illustrating the development of the gas market in Europe from a 
historical perspective, with the objective of illustrating how security of supply issues as well 
as very large investments led to the establishment of long-term supply contracts based on oil-
indexation. The following questions transition to the last section: in a globalizing natural gas 
market, are long-term import contracts still desirable? Does oil-indexation make any sense for 
a growing resource such as gas? 
The third and last section presents the liberalization process within Europe and the hybrid 
pricing model it has led to, with the goal of discussing whether such pricing model is 
desirable and sustainable. It starts by describing the motivations and the evolution of the 
liberalization process, guided by a strong political will from the European Union. The focus is 
mainly on transmission unbundling as well as on the EU’s 10 priority projects aiming at 
supply diversification. To discuss oil versus hub indexation, the relative role of oil and gas in 
Europe’s primary energy mix are discussed. A global perspective is then again taken to 
discuss how all the trends discussed above have led to diverging prices globally and to 
question whether a complete exposure to such variability is desirable or necessary for Europe. 
In particular, Europe’s gas glut is described. Then follows a discussion on European hubs, 
particularly concerning their liquidity and their role: do hub prices really reflect directly 
Europe’s supply/demand balance of natural gas, or are they closer to a balancing market of 
residual volumes? A key question here is whether long-term contracts and hub prices are 
mutually exclusive or whether in fact such combination provides greater value to Europe, 
providing volume flexibility, a price signal indicating over/undersupply (as a basis for 
renegotiations) while at the same time securing supply. Finally, the reorganization and 
restructuring of Europe’s gas business, as a consequence of competition and liberalization, is 
presented.  
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2. NATURAL GAS WITHIN THE WORLD ENERGY 
BALANCE 
Natural gas has acquired over the past years a new and central role in the world economy. An 
important factor contributing to this success has been natural gas’ lower environmental 
impact.  As a fuel, natural gas is cleaner than its rival sources, as illustrated by the following 
chart: 
 
Figure 1: Fossil Fuel Emission Levels (Source: EIA, 1998) 
In addition, natural gas’ resource base is growing. The USA have been able to bring 
large volumes to the market, helping determine a new role for natural gas in the world’s 
economy. This has been due to exploitation of unconventional natural gas sources (shale gas, 
tight gas, and coal bed methane). In the USA, the owner of a plot of land also owns the 
resources found underneath, as opposed to Europe, where such resources are owned by the 
State; furthermore, due to the country’s relative geographical isolation, the USA have 
historically had a greater incentive to develop non-conventional energy sources.  
Finally, global LNG movements, which today, according to BP, account for roughly 
1/3 of all natural gas trade (which in turn accounts for 1/3 of global consumption), are set to 
play an increasing role in providing price and volume flexibility to markets worldwide, 
thereby acting as a catalyst to liberalization, supply and demand diversification, and the 
integration of the global natural gas market.  
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2.1. Consumption and Production 
A. Building a Place for Natural Gas within the EU’s Future Common 
Energy Policy 
Natural gas is a versatile fossil fuel. It can be used for cooking, heating, producing 
electricity, transportation, and as an industrial feedstock. In the industrial sector, the main 
competitors to gas are coal or crude oil products, such as heavy fuel oil; in the domestic 
sector, the main competitor is electricity. As mentioned above, gas is the least polluting of 
other fossil fuels, coal and oil. However, if “clean coal” technologies, allowing on-site carbon 
sequestration, were to become cost-efficient, natural gas could face a formidable competition 
from coal. 
Concerning natural gas’ status within the EU, Percebois (2008)  states that: “The place 
of natural gas is very different from one EU country to another, looking at the primary 
balance or at electricity generation. The disparities observed in the structures of energy 
balances are the product of history and the consequence of strong differences of opinion 
concerning the role of the nuclear sector. This is why there is no real common energy policy 
in Europe but a simple consensus on three priorities: competitiveness, security, and 
sustainability”.  
However, the EU is the world’s biggest importer of oil and natural gas: it imports 
roughly 80% of its oil and 60% of its natural gas (Associated Press, 2007). It is therefore 
crucial for the EU to develop a clear common energy policy that will enable it to speak as one 
voice to third-party countries. For the time being, each country has the freedom to determine 
the composition of its energy mix; on a European scale, common energy policies are aimed at 
achieving the following goals: develop an economy less dependent on carbon (and therefore 
on fossil fuel imports), as well as create liberalized and interconnected energy markets.  
B. Natural Gas in an International Perspective 
On a more international perspective, as shown in the chart below, the United States, 
after a short decline, are now back in competition with Russia to be the world’s leading gas 
producer (Canada, the world’s third largest producer, has been inserted for scale in figure 2). 
As mentioned above, unconventional gas, particularly shale gas, has had a key role in this 
development: in 2010, US shale gas production reached 130 bcm (EIA, 2011), i.e. roughly 
22% of total gas production, compared to 11 bcm in 2000. Another important difference 
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between these two gas giants is that the US consume all domestic production, whereas Russia 
exports roughly 1/3 of it: 
 
Figure 2: Natural Gas Yearly Production and Consumption (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
Figures 3 and 4 chart the distribution of consumption and production of oil and natural gas 
around the world. The area split is suggested by the author and will be maintained along the 
paper. The following areas might require to be detailed in their composition as they do not 
necessarily correspond to standard geographical areas: 
 Rest of Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Gibraltar, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Norway, Switzerland 
 Eurasia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Turkey 
 Former Soviet Union: Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine 
Most of Eurasia is in reality a subset of the Former Soviet Union group; however, these 
countries have been split in a different category to reflect different geopolitical logics as well 
as a different supply/demand balance. In particular, the above split has been operated in the 
more generic category “Total Europe & Eurasia” offered by the BP Statistical Review to 
reflect the distinctions subject to different supply/demand balances as well as different 
legislative powers.  
Looking at oil, it is immediately clear how the world can be divided into regions with a 
production surplus (Africa, the Middle East, and the Former Soviet Union) and regions with a 
production deficit (North America, EU 27, Asia). This clear distinction has been an obvious 
catalyst for the development of oil trade around the globe, as well as to the creation of a 
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producers’ cartel, the OPEC. Such split is also valid when looking at natural gas, albeit in a 
somewhat more limited extent. Referring to natural gas, however, the EU 27’s vulnerability in 
terms of security of supply is apparent. Asia comes second in this respect; its position is 
similar to the EU 27 regarding oil, but is somewhat limited in its dependence when looking at 
gas. The same applies, to a wider extent, to North America: still dependent on foreign oil, this 
area has become virtually self-sufficient when it comes to natural gas thanks to its 
development of non-conventional resources (this point will be developed below) 
 
Figure 3: Oil Yearly Consumption and Production (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2012) 
 
Figure 4: Natural Gas Yearly Consumption and Production (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
Looking at the development of natural gas consumption and production over time, it is 
clear that both have been generally trending upwards following a twofold dynamic: the 
increase in global primary energy consumption, as well as the increasing role of natural gas in 
such mix. There is however a noticeable exception: the EU 27’s production has been steadily 
decreasing since the year 2000, despite most of those years having been characterized by a 
growing GDP; this appears to be an indication that such production has peaked, exacerbating 
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the import dependency highlighted above. The Former Soviet Union’s production has also 
suffered from a steep halt in 2008, but this appears to be mostly related to the sudden crisis 
that hit the EU. A pattern closer to the development of the GDP is visible when looking at 
consumption. Asia and the Middle East are increasing both consumption and production at a 
high pace, with consumption outpacing production in Asia and vice versa in the Middle East.  
 
Figure 5: Historical Development of Natural Gas Production (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
 
Figure 6: Historical Development of Natural Gas Consumption (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
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2.2. Reserves 
The Middle East and Russia hold the largest reserves of conventional gas. On the 
contrary, available sources of unconventional gas are spread across the world, and can be 
found in countries that are currently net importers, such as the USA and China. 
A. Conventional Gas 
Conventional gas is extracted from well-defined reservoirs and can be developed using 
only vertical wells, with recovery of roughly 80% (of the original gas in the deposit). Such 
fields are commonly found in association with oil reservoirs, either mixed with the oil or 
floating on top. This is why, as shown in the charts below, the distribution of natural gas 
reserves generally follows that of oil. As can be seen, the EU 27 lacks both of oil and natural 
gas proven reserves. However, its neighbors are heavily endowed with natural gas: the Middle 
East, the Former Soviet Union and Eurasia are the three most resource-intensive regions of 
the world. 
The fact that conventional oil fields are generally associated with oil reservoirs can act 
as a partial explanation to why the price of gas has been historically linked to oil: as gas was 
being extracted as a by-product of oil, it made sense to link its price to its main counterpart. 
Another major reason was the substitutability in use between oil and gas for their main 
purposes, e.g. heating and power generation.  
Such geographical distribution also does little to alter the geopolitical equilibria which 
characterize today’s world. As will be discussed further, however, shale gas has the potential 
to disrupt this structure.  
Finally, in 2011, global natural gas consumption amounted to 3 223 bcm, while total 
proven reserves amounted to 210 000 bcm (R/P ratio discussed below).  
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Figure 7: Oil Proved Reserves (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
 
Figure 8: Natural Gas Proved Reserves (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
 
B. Unconventional Gas 
Unconventional resources are trapped in less permeable rock, where the resource may 
be distributed over a very large area. They usually require well-stimulation measures, but 
recovery rates are typically of the order of 15-30%. Unconventional deposits are more 
difficult and costly to exploit than conventional ones. They are mostly composed of shale gas 
(natural gas trapped in fine-grained sedimentary rock), tight gas (natural gas trapped in 
impermeable hard rock), and coal bed methane (natural gas trapped in coal strata). 
However, unconventional gas exploitation has the potential to revolutionize the energy 
markets in the coming decades, by altering geopolitics and preventing the rise of new cartels, 
as well as accompanying the transition to renewable energy. Shale gas reserves, spread across 
the world, have the potential to diversify supply risk away from unstable regions (such as 
Iran). Such a supply side shock, once its impact will shift from local to global, will potentially 
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stabilize the economies of industrial countries. If such potential is exploited, however, the 
growth of the LNG market might reduce its pace, as the reliance on foreign supplies will be 
reduced.  
The success of the United States and the potential for further shale gas development 
has initiated an evaluation by most countries of their possible natural gas resources. However, 
whether the USA’s success in shale gas can be reproduced elsewhere is still under debate. 
Outside the United States and Canada, it is unlikely that commercial production will be 
achieved before the end of the decade. Michael Ratner, analyst in energy policy, writes in a 
Congressional Research Service report for the US Congress on December 22nd, 2010: “Most 
countries looking at shale gas do not have the data, technology, or equipment required to 
evaluate their shale gas resources, let alone successfully exploit it, at this point” (Ratner, 
2010). As noted by The Economist (2011), in comparison to the USA, costs are higher in 
Europe: its shale deposits tend to be harder to extract as they are deeper underground, Europe 
does not have a history of drilling and a vast and competitive oil-services industry (and 
associated equipment and know-how), Europe’s gas industry faces more regulations, and 
finally its pipeline network isn’t as far-reaching and developed. Some European countries also 
oppose shale gas for environmental reasons, namely seismic fears and pollution concerns both 
of air and groundwater.  
On the other hand, the potential, according to the EIA, is there. Initial assessments of 
48 shale gas basins in 32 countries suggest that shale gas resources are also available in other 
regions of the world. Shale-gas resources are believed to extend into countries that currently 
depend heavily on natural gas imports, such as France, Poland, Germany, Turkey and 
Ukraine. Poland should have Europe’s most favorable geology, and it might become a 
significant producer in a matter of years. This is fortunate, as shale-gas production would 
most likely make it easier to phase out Poland’s subsidies to local coal production, while also 
reducing the country’s dependence on Russia for gas. 
According to the EIA’s 2011 report, World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial 
Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States, roughly 160 000 bcm of technically 
recoverable shale gas reserves are available outside the US, which, including US recoverable 
reserves, amounts to roughly 190 000 bcm of reserves. This is likely to add to the present 
210 000 bcm of proven natural gas reserves available worldwide. Given today’s total world 
consumption, this switches the Reserves to Production ratio (R/P) from 65 years to 124 years. 
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This is just to give an idea of the scale, as such ratio is subject to different dynamics which 
can alter its value over time (consumption grows with economic growth and production 
cannot physically stay at the same level as fields are depleted). In particular, there isn’t yet a 
consensus on how quickly the rate of production from currently producing wells will slow in 
the future. Nevertheless, such estimates point out to a revolution in natural gas’ geopolitical 
landscape, as shown in the chart below:  
 
Figure 9: Shale Gas: Technically Recoverable Reserves (Source: US Energy Information 
Administration, 2011) 
The results from the EIA’s study are likely to be conservative, as they exclude areas 
such as Russia and the Middle East, do not consider all shale basins in the studied countries 
(yellow areas in the chart above) as well as the offshore resources.  
Concerning Europe and its current deep economic depression, perhaps the most 
significant conclusion has been given by Daniel Gros, Director of the Center for European 
Policy Studies (2012): “In an environment of ultra-low interest rates, the economic cost of 
being late is low. The best option for Europe might be to wait and let the market operate. 
Fracking is not yet a mature technology, and thus it is very likely to improve over time. 
Maybe Europe will become a leader in “advanced fracking” when the shale-gas deposits in 
the US have already been exhausted.” 
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2.2. Trade 
A. Overview of Global Trade Movements 
The table below is the result of the author’s own extrapolation based on the data collected by the BP Statistical Review (2011). “Total 
imports” are defined as the sum of imports to countries within each area; “intra-regional trade” is trade which has taken place among countries 
within a given area; “net imports” represent therefore the total volumes that have effectively been imported (only) by each area.  
 
LNG Pipeline Total 
2011 
Total 
Imports 
Intra-Regional 
Trade 
Net 
Imports 
Total 
Imports 
Intra-Regional 
Trade 
Net 
Imports 
Total 
Imports 
Intra-Regional 
Trade 
Net 
Imports 
North America       17,35                            -         17,35      128,77                  128,77              -           146,12                  128,77       17,35  
S. & Cent. America       10,94                       6,11          4,83        15,63                     15,63              -              26,57                     21,74          4,83  
EU 27       84,44                       0,49       83,95      327,16                  176,74     150,42         411,60                  177,23     234,37  
Rest of Europe              -                              -                -            5,93                       3,47          2,46              5,93                       3,47          2,46  
Eurasia         6,23                            -            6,23        45,11                     36,06          9,05            51,34                     36,06       15,28  
Former Soviet Union              -                              -                -          91,54                     91,54              -              91,54                     91,54              -    
Middle East         4,60                       2,50          2,11        31,59                     19,20       12,39            36,19                     21,70       14,50  
Africa              -                              -                -            5,66                       5,66              -                5,66                       5,66              -    
Asia     207,26                     70,99     136,28        36,91                     22,66       14,25         244,17                     93,65     150,53  
Oceania              -                              -                -            6,30                       6,30              -                6,30                       6,30              -    
Total     330,83                     80,08     250,74      694,61                  506,03     188,57      1 025,43                  586,12     439,32  
Figure 10: Natural Gas Trade Movement (Source: Author's elaboration based on data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn: 
 Global net imports account for roughly 15% of 2011 total world consumption. 
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 Intra-regional trade and international trade are roughly balanced. 
 
 LNG plays a major role in connecting the areas, as LNG total net imports are more 
important than pipeline total net imports. 
 
 On the other hand, pipeline gas has a major part in intra-regional trade. 
  As shown in the following chart, the EU 27 and Asia are by far the most import 
dependent areas; however, the EU 27 is much more dependent on its pipeline imports, 
whereas Asia relies mostly on its LNG supplies (clearly, such chart is much more relevant for 
these two areas, as they are the in deficit). LNG is of major relevance in Asian intra-regional 
trade, which is likely to lead to the creation of a relevant spot market, driven by the creation 
of a hub in Shanghai and Singapore (more below). 
 
Figure 11: Natural Gas Net Imports (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
Percebois (2008) provides interesting statistical information: “60 % of the gas 
consumed in the EU crosses at least one border, compared with 10 % for electricity”. As 
clearly evinced by the chart above, supply disruptions are a major threat to Europe and is 
therefore a major preoccupation of the European Commission. The supply security is 
maintained via long-term supply contracts with the main gas exporting countries (Russia, 
Norway, and Algeria). Such contracts appeared in the 1960s as a means to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the investments in costly transnational pipelines (to import gas from 
the Netherlands, and later in the 1970s from Norway and Russia) or in liquefaction and re-
gasification facilities to import Algerian gas. According to Percebois (2008): “Price fixing 
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was done on the basis of “net back”, which came down to charging a price that was slightly 
lower to countries that were the furthest away from the export location; this was to 
compensate the additional costs associated with gas transmission. Such clause has 
disappeared has disappeared but the “take or pay” clauses, which force the importer to pay for 
the amount of gas according to the terms of the contract, regardless of whether or not the 
delivery was made, still exist”. In parallel, the LNG market is developing globally allowing 
countries to diversify their sources of supply.  
B. LNG Market Development 
The technology for LNG first started being developed in the 1960s, quickly 
establishing itself, particularly in Asia, where Japan has always imported gas as LNG. Such 
technology allows “stranded gas”, i.e. gas whose consumption destination is too far from its 
production well to be transported via pipelines. According to the International Gas Union’s 
World LNG Report (2011), there are today 18 countries exporting and 27 countries importing 
liquid gas. Global trade increased from 3 bcm in 1970 to 331 bcm in 2011. Qatar is the 
world’s largest exporter, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Algeria. It now accounts for a 
quarter of the world’s LNG exports. 
The IGU World LNG Report (2011) provides us with the following table listing the 
major LNG exporting and importing countries. Data in MT has been converted in bcm 
according to the following conversion: 1 MT = 1.31643 bcm (Interconnector, 2011). 
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Figure 12: Main LNG Importers and Exporters (Source: IGU World LNG Report 2011) 
The Economist (2012) states that the costs of LNG projects have been increasing since 
the end of the 1990s, mainly due to two reasons: firstly, steel, of which LNG projects are 
intensive, has shot up in price; secondly, the most relevant growth in liquefaction capacity is 
expected from Australia, which is not a low-wage developing country. Finally, The 
Economist (2012) states that “liquefying the gas, carrying it to its destination and regasifying 
it can cost between $4 and $7 mBtu, a lot more than the $2.50 mBtu that the gas itself 
currently sells for in America”. 
However, global LNG trade has nevertheless been growing at a pace much higher than 
the one of the gas market as a whole. If we rely on the figure below provided from the IGU 
LNG Report (2011) as well as the figures from the BP Statistical Review (2011), we can see 
how the LNG market has grown from accounting for roughly 4% of global consumption in 
1990 to roughly 10% in 2011. 
Importer bcm Exporter bcm
Japan 103,7 Qatar 99,4
Korea 47,1 Malaysia 32,9
United Kingdom 24,5 Indonesia 28,2
Spain 22,5 Australia 25,3
China 16,9 Nigeria 24,6
India 16,7 Trinidad 18,3
Taiwan 16,1 Algeria 16,6
France 14,1 Russia 13,8
Italy 8,4 Oman 10,4
United States 7,8 Brunei 9,0
Turkey 6,1 Yemen 8,8
Belgium 5,9 Egypt 8,4
Argentina 4,2 UAE 7,8
Mexico 3,8 Equatorial Guinea 5,3
Chile 3,7 Peru 5,0
Canada 3,2 Norway 3,8
Kuwait 3,2 US 0,4
Portugal 2,9 Libya 0,1
UAE 1,6
Greece 1,3
Dom. Rep. 1,0
Thailand 1,0
Brazil 0,9
Netherlands 0,9
Puerto Rico 0,7
Total 318,0 318,0
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Figure 13: LNG Trade Volumes 1980-2011 (Source: Cedigaz, Waterborne LNG Reports, US Energy 
Information Agency (EIA), US Department of Energy (DOE), PEC Energy) 
In the United States, Cheniere has managed to get an export license, allowing it to sell 
American gas to shippers such as BG Group or Union Fenosa, at Henry Hub (the US national 
market reference) prices plus a 15% mark-up. The destination of such gas is likely to be Asia, 
which will create an explicit link between the prices of the two markets. However, it remains 
to be seen how many exports, which will effectively increase prices for US consumers, will be 
allowed. Transportation costs are also an unknown variable. In particular, if the Panama Canal 
authorities decide on a special premium for LNG tankers routing from the Gulf of Mexico to 
Japan, China or South Korea, the US might end up being a minor exporter of gas.  
Asia appears to be the main source of growth for the LNG market. On the long run, 
Canada might ship significant volumes of LNG from its west coast to Asia, as well as Africa 
and Russia. In particular, Gazprom, Total and Statoil, have been discussing a final investment 
decision on Shtokman, a big gas field in the Barents Sea. The main issue is marketing the gas: 
its original intention was to produce LNG for the US, but its output seems now more likely to 
be destined for Asia. China is quickly building LNG import terminals: it has four already 
operational, five under construction and twelve more planned. Shanghai and Singapore could 
become a regional hub for spot markets based on competition between LNG, pipeline gas and 
domestic production. 
Although the LNG spot market is growing fast, in 2011 the industry delivered on spot 
only roughly 25% of total LNG traded volumes (see figure below from the IGU LNG 2011 
Report). These in turn count for roughly 10% of global natural gas consumption in 2011, 
which means that in 2011 spot LNG cargoes account for roughly 3% of global consumption. 
However, some signs suggest that LNG markets are getting more flexible: Europe, looking to 
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diversify away from Gazprom’s dominant position, is adding LNG import capacity. Asian 
buyers are also getting reluctant to sign 20-year oil-indexed contracts in current negotiations 
with Canadian suppliers.  
 
Figure 14: Volume of Spot LNG Trade and Share of Total LNG Trade 1995-2011 (Source: Cedigaz, 
Waterborne LNG Reports, US DOE, PFC Energy) 
In the longer term, as shale gas becomes more widespread outside America, some 
countries will no longer need to import LNG. This, on one hand, might free more supplies for 
the spot market; however, if shale gas extraction expands rapidly, this could also deter the 
creation of a liquid global LNG market, as local supplies become more abundant.  
Percebois (2008) states that: “Gas transmission is expensive; its cost is similar to that of 
electricity and much higher than that of oil”. This can be linked to the following quote from 
The Economist (2012): “Oil […] used to be bought and sold largely in regional markets in the 
1950s and 1960s, but the development of supertankers has since made it a global product. 
Paul Stevens of Chatham House points out that in the early 1950s transport accounted for a 
third of the cost of Persian Gulf oil shipped to America. Only 20 years later that share had 
dropped to a mere 5%. The industry had been convinced that the world would become ever 
thirstier for oil, so it made huge investments in refining capacity, infrastructure and tankers. 
[…] A similarly dramatic change in the economics of shifting gas is much less likely. 
Pipelines remain costly to build, and a buyer has to be found and a price (generally linked to 
that of oil) agreed on before construction can start. Much of this applies to LNG too”. 
However, The Economist (2012) concludes that “in 20 years’ time gas around the world 
will probably be sold under an array of contractual arrangements based on a single price, set 
by supply and demand. When deep, liquid markets with credible prices develop, supply is 
assured and long-term contracts become unnecessary. MIT’s boffins believe that integrated 
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global markets would increase gas supplies, raise demand and bring down prices. It may be a 
long way off, but the foundations for such a market are starting to be built”. 
C. LNG Arbitrage 
As discussed, pipeline natural gas has traditionally supplied adjacent markets. Such 
regional markets were characterized by their own supply-demand balances, gas price 
formation mechanisms and contractual structures. In parallel to pipeline supplies, LNG 
projects have developed; such projects are significantly capital-intensive, which led the 
project developers to cover their future LNG production with sales arrangements (thereby 
sharing the risk of such projects with the buyers of LNG). Even though long-term contracts 
remain central in the LNG industry, significant changes have started taking place recently, 
such as the elimination from some new contracts of the destination clause (which constrained 
the destination of the LNG exported volumes), as well as an increase in the number of 
uncommitted “spot” LNG cargos. 
With the growth of an increasingly flexible LNG supply, regional markets, previously 
relatively isolated, become progressively more connected. As LNG producing and consuming 
countries grew and uncommitted LNG volumes appeared on the market, the liquidity of the 
LNG market has increased, as well as the arbitrage opportunities between markets. Such trend 
is a key development for the speed and magnitude of the interaction among the different 
regional gas markets.  
As will be further developed below, gas prices in different markets have diverged 
historically to the point of creating opportunities for LNG arbitrage. However, such type of 
trading has not yet developed enough to create a price convergence between different markets 
towards a unique global price (both on short and long maturities). Ms. Polina Zhuravleva 
wrote an interesting paper in 2009 for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in which she 
details a framework of barriers and conditions for LNG arbitrage to be developed. Using 
online questionnaires, interviews as well as discussions at the Oxford Institute of Energy 
Studies, Ms. Zhuravleva developed in particular the following definition of LNG arbitrage: 
“LNG Arbitrage can be defined as a physical cargo diversion from one market to another, 
which offers a higher price. The diversion of the cargo can be regarded as arbitrage if the 
cargo was initially committed to the first market and to the initial buyer in a commercial 
contract”. Therefore, an LNG arbitrage is a practice that allows contractually committed LNG 
to be diverted to another market (clearly, granted the mutual agreement of both the seller and 
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the buyer), allowing to benefit from market inefficiencies and regional supply/demand 
imbalances. 
Therefore, re-routing of LNG cargoes can be considered an arbitrage only if such 
cargoes were contractually intended for another market. The gain resulting from the arbitrage 
will usually have to be shared between the seller and the initial buyer. There are several ways 
to perform an LNG arbitrage: based on the seller’s initiative (i.e. the seller want to sell the 
cargo on another market to acquire the gain), based on the buyer’s initiative (if, for example, 
the cargo can be replaced with cheaper purchases on the local market, or if the buyer does not 
need that cargo any longer), and based on the initiative of an independent trader (buying the 
cargo from an initial buyer and diverting to another customer. Hence, the participants of the 
deal can be: the seller, the initial buyer, the end buyer, and/or an independent intermediary.  
Ms. Zhuravleva identified the following barriers to the growth of LNG arbitrage: 
 An insufficient price differential between markets (the price spread has to be 
sufficient to cover the transaction costs). 
 A very tight LNG market: a buyer won’t agree to a cargo diversion if the 
market is very tight and it is very difficult to replace the diverted LNG cargo 
from the spot LNG market or the domestic gas market. In a tight LNG market, 
the security of supply dimension becomes much more relevant, hindering the 
possibilities for LNG market diversion.  
 Small number of players in the LNG market. 
 Missing global LNG trading and information platforms: trading platforms as 
well as global information media would facilitate the LNG arbitrages. 
 Lack of price transparency: it is not frequent for LNG importers to publish the 
prices for LNG. 
 Lack of experienced traders and specialists: in an environment in which 
information is lacking, experience and personal contacts make up for it. 
 Contractual limitations: clauses such as the destination clause clearly hinder 
market arbitrage; as new liquefaction capacity comes online and demand 
growth rates soften, buyers will have an increased capacity to ask for more 
flexibility with the sales arrangements. 
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 Technical restrictions: arbitrage is complicated as LNG specifications and 
infrastructure is not standardized, thereby restricting the diversion of LNG 
cargoes.  
 Regulatory and market restrictions: LNG ship authorizations and controls are 
frequently time consuming, thereby restricting LNG arbitrage. 
 Potential lack of shipping and regasification capacity (this, however, does not 
seem to be the case in reality). 
 Inefficient hedging instruments: due to the specific conditions of LNG trade, it 
is difficult to define a price/volume match between the actual deal in place and 
the (standardized) price/volume conditions of the hedge.  
Such barriers can then be organized in the following framework (Zhuravleva, 2009), 
which illustrates the complexity before arriving at the realization of an actual LNG arbitrage. 
Of all the above, the first two appear to be the most likely to effectively hinder the 
development of a global LNG arbitrage market.  
 
Figure 15: An Analysis of LNG Arbitrage (Source: Zhuravleva, 2009) 
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In short, LNG arbitrage between markets internationally appears to be, for the time 
being, limited due to a high number of inefficiencies within such process. Therefore, 
international natural gas prices might still diverge. Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, 
the LNG spot market, as discussed above, is still of limited relevance – it accounts for roughly 
30% of the LNG market, which in turn accounts for roughly 30% of the total world imports. 
However, if we look only at the net imports (i.e. international trade among macro-regions, 
excluding intra-regional trade), LNG becomes much more relevant, as illustrated in table 1. 
Also, it can be argued that the LNG spot market could be used as a price signal for the re-
negotiations of long-term arrangement, similarly to what has taken place for imports via 
pipeline (this point will be discussed below). Therefore, despite significant rigidities in the 
LNG market concerning both spot trading and arbitrage opportunities, it appears to be quite 
likely that the development of the spot market as well as of the arbitrage market will, over the 
next years, bring a greater convergence within global natural gas prices. It is important to 
distinguish between arbitrage and price convergence: the fundamental trend appears to be the 
development of uncommitted and flexible volumes on the spot market; as arbitrage 
opportunities become increasingly accessible (reduction of transaction costs, next to the 
purple box in the figure above), such convergence is likely to accelerate. A key aspect behind 
such developments is the maintenance of a long global system for gas.  
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3. GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON NATURAL GAS IN EUROPE 
3.1. Market Power 
A. Oil OPEC 
Looking at oil, the “call on OPEC” is an expression which represents the possibility 
that OPEC will have to make up for a growing discrepancy between total oil consumption and 
non-OPEC production. This is illustrated graphically in the following chart by the red area. 
As the world’s non-OPEC production appears to stagnate, the implication is that OPEC will 
be expected to supply an increasing share of the world’s total oil demand. However, OPEC 
might not be interested in doing so, as its domestic consumption increases and as increasing 
prices might create an incentive to hold oil in the ground. 
 
Figure 16: Oil the Call on OPEC (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
B. Gas OPEC 
The following chart illustrates a much more limited, albeit increasing, role for OPEC 
members in the natural gas world scenario.  
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Figure 17: Natural Gas: A Call on OPEC? (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
Furthermore, as the following charts show (and was already partially illustrated 
above), percentagewise, natural gas consumption and production are roughly balanced, except 
for the very import exception of the EU, China and Japan. However, if we look at the 
distribution of today’s proven reserves, 60% are concentrated in the hands of the Middle East 
and the Former Soviet Union (such percentage would increase to 74% if the FSU were to 
include Eurasia). 45% of global proven reserves are concentrated in Africa and the Middle 
East. These considerations might illustrate a potentially ever growing role for OPEC countries 
in the world’s natural gas supply. However, it should be noted that, reserves in Eurasia 
(Turkmenistan), Asia, and North America are growing rapidly. 
 
Figure 18: Natural Gas Consumption and Production Percentagewise (Source: BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2012 
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Figure 19: Natural Gas Proved Reserves Percentagewise (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
 
Figure 20: Historical Development of Natural Gas Proved Reserves (Source: BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2012) 
On the other hand, if we chart a possible “call on OPEC” for natural gas, where the 
“gas OPEC” is defined as including OPEC as well as Russia (this will be explained in more 
detail below), we obtain the following result: 
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Figure 21: Natural Gas: A Call on OPEC? Looking forward (Source: Author's elaboration of data from 
the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
This has been charted using simple average growth rates for consumption and non-gas 
OPEC production over the past 10 years (equal to, respectively, 2.8% and 2.4%). A gas OPEC 
role appears to be limited, in any case reduced if compared to the case of oil. Finally, this is, 
of course, subject to a high degree of uncertainty depending on the global development of the 
unconventional gas industry, as discussed above.  
So far, a gas OPEC has not yet been instituted. However, the Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum exists, comprising Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Its members together control roughly 
60% of the world’s natural gas reserves. Its main objective is to foster dialogue between 
producers and thereby enforce the concept of mutuality of interests. Such organization has not 
yet acted effectively as a cartel, determining production and prices of natural gas. Follow 
some of the main reasons: 
 The global market for natural gas is yet too fractured; as gas is used primarily 
as a electricity and heating source, it has several substitutes (such as coal, 
renewable, nuclear energy).  
 Furthermore, two of the main producers, Venezuela and Iran, do not have 
much left in the market: they have grown from net exporters to net importers of 
natural gas.  
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 Also, given the important developments in unconventional gas production, a 
natural gas cartel aiming to fix prices would have little effect on North 
America.  
 Most natural gas is still shipped through a regional network of international 
pipelines. As discussed all along this paper, gas sales are typically, for the time 
being, directed towards specific buyers under long-term contracts. 
To increase cooperation, important gas producers such as Russia and Algeria could try 
to exert some influence on the rapidly developing LNG industry. In general, Russia appears to 
have filled the leadership void that was characterizing the GECF. In December 2009, 
following the election of the vice-president of the Russian energy engineering company 
Stroytransgaz, Mr. Leonid Bokhanovsky, as Secretary-General of the GECF, Russia's Energy 
Minister Sergey Shmatko stated: "Today we can speak about gas OPEC as a fully fledged 
international organization. By a unanimous decision a Russian national was elected its 
secretary general. This is to show that member countries expect Russia to use its political 
weight to promote it" (Russia Today, 2009). 
However, as huge quantities of unconventional US shale gas have been brought to the 
market, causing Henry Hub (the main US reference pricing point for gas) prices to tumble and 
changing the geopolitical picture for the United States by making it self-sufficient in gas at 
least for the near future, patterns of trade have shifted globally and other countries in Europe 
and Asia have, as discussed above, started exploring their own gas potential. Such global 
developments, which affect the supply situation as well as the trade movements from one 
continent to another, are starting to put pressure on longstanding arrangements, such as oil-
linked gas contracts. The separate dimension of North American, European, and Asian gas 
markets is being brought into question as the interactions become more evident, and 
unprecedented strategic shifts, such as the weakening of Russia’s dominance in the European 
gas market, appear increasingly plausible. 
3.2. EU Supply Diversification 
In 2011, roughly 26% of the gas consumption of the EU came from Russia. There are 
two principal routes exporting gas from Russia to Europe (Percebois, 2008): via Ukraine 
(transferring roughly 80% of the total gas) and via Byelorussia. The gas conflicts between 
Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine and Byelorussia, on the other, in 2006 and 2007, 
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represent a threat for Europe’s security of Supply, which is the reason why alternatives routes 
started being developed (as mentioned above). Furthermore, as a result of the “gas wars”, 
Russia (Gazprom) obtained the control of the transmission pipelines in the Ukraine and 
Byelorussia. This added to the participation of Gazprom in the capital of many transmission 
firms across Europe (in the Baltic countries, in Hungary, Slovakia, Germany and Romania). 
According to Percebois (2008), “Gazprom has accompanied this strategy of downstream 
integration by a policy to increase transmission capacity, and this for two main reasons: to 
expand and to secure export channels to Europe”. Thereby, Russia is a majority shareholder in 
the consortium for the construction and operation of the North Stream gas pipeline, which 
avoids Byelorussia as well as Poland and the Baltic countries.  
However, the Nabucco project is also currently under development. As mentioned 
above, such project is being developed by a consortium including Austrian (OMV), 
Hungarian (MOL), Turkish (Botas), Bulgarian (Bulgargaz) and Rumanian (Transgaz) oil and 
gas companies, and its purpose is to transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe via 
Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. Such pipeline could theoretically also 
transfer gas from Iran (the second ranked country in the world in terms of gas reserves), 
whose exports are nowadays still limited. 
Russia’s response to the Nabucco project is the South Stream project, launched in 
2007 in collaboration with ENI, and whose maximum discharge is projected to be 31 
bcm/year. Such pipeline would connect Russia to Bulgaria via the Black Sea by 2015. It 
would then divide into two routes heading to Austria and Italy. Furthermore, Russia has also 
signed long-term supply agreements in 2007 with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, to continue 
buying gas from these countries at low price (as they do not have many export routes, being 
landlocked) for its domestic consumption, in order to export its gas at a higher value towards 
European markets). Such agreements directly enter into competition with the Nabucco project 
as well as with the TCGP (Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline) for Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas 
reserves, undermining their profitability.  
During 2007, Gazprom and the public Kazakh firm, KazMunaiGaz, also signed an 
agreement over 15 years in order to create a joint company, which will ensure the treatment of 
Kazakh gas in the Orenburg complex in Russia. The Kazakh firm has promised to supply 16 
bcm of gas each year to Gazprom, and during the Achkabad summit which took place in May 
2007 in Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to construct, by 2013, a gas pipeline of 
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an overall capacity of 20 bcm, which will cross both countries, border the Caspian Sea and 
end in Russia. This agreement could compromise the economic profitability of Nabucco, and 
above all, it could jeopardize the ‘Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline’ (TCGP), which has been 
constructed to export gas from Turkmenistan to the EU by passing via the Caspian Sea and 
Azerbaijan. 
Furthermore, India and China would like to construct gas pipelines giving them access 
to Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen gas. Projects are currently being developed to exploit such 
potential, and the competition could become fiercer as natural gas demand from Asia 
increases. If such development were to materialize, Russian exports could increasingly be 
diverted towards Asia, putting the EU effectively in competition for the resource. As 
economic growth recovers in Europe, and as a consequence natural gas demand, Russia could 
see its own strategic relevance increasingly sustained.  
As we can see, political considerations strongly affect the economic factors in the 
international natural gas exchanges in Europe. The idea that Gazprom or Sonatrach could 
attempt to take over European gas networks is more plausible, as they are Government owned 
firms who tend to obey political logics. However, this problem is minimized; such companies 
are likely to face strong resistance from the EU who will implement legal barriers for 
companies outside the EU seeking access to the gas networks in Europe.  
3.3. Looking Ahead: Four Scenarios Based on 
Unconventional Gas Growth and Liberalization 
Progress 
Harvard University provides a very interesting framework to analyze natural gas 
geopolitics. As part of its “Geopolitics of Energy Project”, the university organized a 
workshop in which a group of country experts, economic modelers, and industry 
representatives developed four scenarios for the future of natural gas markets. Such scenarios 
change according to two dimensions: gas liberalization and success of unconventional gas. 
The modelers used seven variables or drivers (Harvard University, 2012): 
 Geopolitics, i.e. the international impact of individual country decisions. 
 “Great powers and their interactions”, i.e. the relative fortunes of United States, Russia 
and China as well as their ability to influence the world. 
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 Critical events, such as natural disasters, political change, accidents, or new scientific 
information which lead, for example, to a ban on shale fracking or more stringent 
environmental regulations. 
 Regime stability in countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela affecting 
supply (both on the short- and medium-term) and demand (namely, altering demand as 
a consequence of price disruptions). 
 Gasification of the power and transport sectors (the latter being more uncertain than 
the former). 
 Renewables and carbon pricing, which could play a critical role in influencing the 
competition among fuels and enhance the “window” for natural gas as a bridge fuel. 
 Resource access and NIMBY (acronym for “not in my back yard” denoting opposition 
by residents to a project guilty of being developed too close to them), limiting, in 
particular, the development of unconventional gas. 
The four scenarios are as follows: 
 
Figure 22: The Geopolitics of Natural Gas (Source: Harvard University, 2012) 
A. Scenario 1 – High Success of Unconventional Gas & Liberalization 
The first scenario assumes a high success of both unconventional gas and market 
liberalization. An oversupplied US market causes national prices to tumble, fostering 
economic growth. Exports to Europe are limited by its depressed economy and its established 
renewable energy sources. Europe looks at the US with envy: its lawmakers enact further 
market liberalization as well as reverse anti-fracking legislation, while also reducing 
remaining subsidies to renewable sources. Shale production rises, further lowering the 
demand for LNG shipments to the US as well as pipeline imports from Russia. As a 
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consequence, competition among gas suppliers in Europe intensifies. Trading hubs develop, 
driving Russia towards “gas-on-gas” pricing (i.e. indexing the price of its long-term exports to 
hub price signals given by European markets).  
LNG exporters therefore divert their attention to Asia, particularly China. In the light 
of increasing supplies from Africa, Latin America (Argentina), North America and Australia, 
China becomes more willing to increase its dependence on natural gas markets, mostly via 
LNG imports. At the same time, China’s regulators put in place market mechanisms to 
prepare for the development of its own shale gas resources while the investments in necessary 
infrastructure (pipeline and storage) are kicked-off. Asian markets benefit from the global 
downward trend in gas prices; some buyer competition comes from Japan (nuclear phase-out 
following the Fukushima disaster), but perceptions of ample long-term supplies sourced from 
outside the Middle East keep attracting new buyers towards the natural gas market. A 
substitution effect starts taking place towards oil demand.  
Middle Eastern uncertainties, as well as climatic concerns, create incentives for 
consuming economies to switch to alternative fuels in transportation as well as public 
transportation. 
In 2020, the development of natural gas markets worldwide has isolated the Middle 
East. Furthermore, the region is further affected by the fall in oil revenues, which creates 
further civil unrest and spiking oil prices. In the natural gas industry, a strong downwards 
trend in prices starts creating renewed consolidation; however, demand centers pick up, 
helped by carbon pricing, thereby reducing such dynamic and preserving competitive natural 
gas markets. A global switch towards alternative transportation, gas supply abundance and 
diversification, growing gas hubs, and soaring oil prices all eventually create a transition away 
from oil to natural gas and renewable energy as the main drivers of economic activity.  
B. Scenario 2 – Low Success of Unconventional Gas & Liberalization 
The second scenario is diametrically opposite, assuming low unconventional gas 
development as well as low liberalization success. A flat US demand, as well as 
environmental concerns on shale gas (following several severe incidents) combine to push 
legislators towards a moratorium on fracking. As the possibility of US-sourced LNG 
disappears from the global market, Europe and Asia shift their focus towards the Middle East, 
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which in turn limits its supply. Furthermore, this gives ever more power to Iran, increasing the 
regions instability.  
Europe remains locked in a regional supply system (comprising Algeria, Norway, and 
Russia), with producers attempting to get ever higher prices. The death of competition among 
gas exporters blocks all political incentives towards creating a regional transport network (in 
particular, Russia denies transit to Turkmen gas towards Europe).  
Oil and gas prices continue to trend upwards, creating a comparative advantage for 
coal. The threat of energy insecurity exacerbates tensions between China and the United 
States. Resource nationalism soars, particularly in Latin America, which decides not to take 
the risk to alter its oil subsidy schemes to enhance the development of its shale gas resources. 
As coal consumption increases, global carbon emissions increase, creating enthusiasm for 
renewable energy sources, carbon pricing schemes and nuclear energy. Prospects for 
international trade become increasingly bleak, as major economies become increasingly 
protectionist. 
C.  Scenario 3 - Low Success of Unconventional Gas & High 
Liberalization 
The third scenario is based on a low development of unconventional gas, but a high 
degree of progress towards liberalization. Again, a temporary ban on fracking is imposed in 
the US as a consequence of, for example, methane leakage during gas production. The US 
increase pipeline imports from Canada. European and Asian markets also resort to cross-
border trade to offset higher energy prices. Russia’s market share in the European market is 
mitigated by increasing LNG deliveries from Qatar. Asia’s demand for LNG is addressed by 
Australian suppliers. The priority in Europe is to protect its energy security by developing a 
regional transport network, diversifying its supply sources (supporting, for example, the 
Trans-Caspian pipeline) and increasing gas and power trading and grid connections. EU’s 
leaders coordinate a new regulatory framework for the construction and long-term 
coordination of a cross-border pipeline system. Trading hubs and forward markets gain 
momentum.  
Russian leaders, losing authority over Caspian flows and European pricing, respond by 
turning towards the creation of a “gas OPEC”. Declining conventional gas production in 
North America, the North Sea and Europe increases reliance on Middle Eastern supplies, a 
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region again exposed to increasing instability as a result of Iran’s policies. The US, 
increasingly import-dependent, see their economy and global influence fade in the face of 
increasing oil and gas prices, as opposed to China, whose economy and status as a global 
trading partner keep growing. Negotiations between China, Qatar and Iran result in the 
formation of a new gas cartel. 
The international community turns towards energy efficiency to moderate demand. 
Firms begin to focus more on carbon sequestration and renewable energy as natural gas loses 
its status as a reliable transition fuel. Facing a tight energy source, China pursues conventional 
gas development in Latin America, Africa, and the Caspian region. The OECD, to avoid 
global conflict on increasingly limited oil and gas resources as well as the abandon of 
liberalized markets, focuses on renewable energy, clean coal, and coal gasification projects. 
D. Scenario 4 - High Success of Unconventional Gas & Low 
Liberalization 
The fourth and final scenario is one of high unconventional gas development and low 
liberalization. Such scenario is triggered by a Middle Eastern crisis (for example, a Saudi 
regime transition) which creates an oil spike and promotes natural gas as a substitute fuel. In 
the US, lawmakers grow concerned over the nation’s energy security, and exports of LNG are 
banned. Low gas prices give rise to an “energy-intensive manufacturing renaissance”, as well 
as a switch towards natural gas in the US transportation market. Japan returns to nuclear. 
Japan, India and China increase LNG imports and start exploring domestic shale potential.  
The oil spike puts EU leaders under pressure to create protectionist policies. The 
Russian dependency has become more alarming than ever. Europe turns to nuclear as well as 
massive investments in shale, slowly displacing Russian imports. Momentum towards gas 
liberalization and trading slows as producing European countries try to ensure that domestic 
supplies are not exported, causing price-diverging paths between different national hubs. 
Russia responds by re-routing its supplies to Asia. Eventually, low gas prices phase out coal-
fired power generation. 
For Europe, the first scenario is clearly the most favorable one, as abundant LNG 
imports allow it to diversify away from Russian dependency, and ultimately pivot the region 
towards a full gas-on-gas pricing mechanism. A high unconventional gas development 
combined with low liberalization is also possible, mostly if an oil spike were to make Europe 
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more dependent on gas and therefore indirectly foster protectionist policies within the EU. 
Low unconventional gas development scenarios are triggered by a ban on fracking. These are 
the worst scenarios for Europe, as it would most likely remain locked in a regional supply 
system, highly vulnerable to competition with Asia. A high degree of liberalization is possible 
if Europe works towards creating a regional trading system to diversify away from Russian 
imports. To this Russia is most likely to respond with the creation of a “gas OPEC”. Low 
liberalization is also possible if all LNG supplies are absorbed by Asia, blocking supply 
diversification and further incentives towards the creation of a regional transport and trading 
network. 
3.4. Long-Term Contracts and Security of Supply 
A. History and Rationale 
Long-term natural gas import contracts were created in the 1960s to import gas from 
the Netherlands, as well as, later on, from the Soviet Union and Norway. Such contracts 
linked a gas producer with each of the import monopolies of the European States, while 
managing the risks (both of volume and price) in such a way that they would be shared 
between buyer and supplier. As will be developed below, the EU’s liberalization of the 
natural gas and energy markets, by allowing competition among suppliers and the 
development of spot and forward markets, is likely to increase the exposure of the EU’s 
traditional gas suppliers to price risk and volume risk. This will create an environment of 
greater uncertainty, in which prices will adapt more rapidly to the interaction of the supply 
and demand sides with the global condition of the natural gas resource. On the other hand, 
such an environment can be perceived as a threat to security of supply (if long term import 
contracts were not to exist anymore), again, both in terms of price and risk. 
The security of natural gas supply is in general addressed via the negotiation of long-
term contracts with suppliers outside the EU (Norway, Russia, Algeria, Libya and LNG 
exporters such as Qatar), while the promotion of competition takes place through the 
development of regional European markets (providing both a spot and forward price signal). 
As discussed in the introduction, supply diversification has a strong political connotation, 
which implies that market logic has to be taken into account along with strategic and 
geopolitical considerations.  
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The aim of long-term contracts is to combine the interest of the seller and the 
purchaser over a long-term horizon in order to make heavy investment in costly transnational 
pipelines or liquefaction and regasification facilities pay-off. A main feature of such long-
term agreements are the take-or-pay clauses, which force the purchaser to pay for a certain 
amount of gas according to the terms of the contract, regardless of whether or not such gas 
volumes were indeed needed and delivered. Such clause guarantees the maintenance of 
security of supply.  
B. Arguments in Favor and Against 
Percebois (2008) lists a series of arguments in favor and against long-term contracts. 
Among the contrary arguments are the following: 
 Long-term supply contracts (20-25 years) can be considered as entry barriers likely to 
hinder competition, as they limit the development of spot markets upon which 
operators could supply themselves more easily and that would offer a price signal fully 
reflecting the demand/supply balance present in a national market at a given point in 
time. 
 The increasing development of LNG is a favorable competition factor as importers 
have many supply locations to choose from and exporters have many destinations at 
their disposal. 
 As the international gas pipeline network expands, the constraints stemming from the 
rigidity of pipelines are reduced as gas can take several routes to reach its destination.  
 Finally, such contracts prevent buyers and sellers from taking advantage of 
opportunities present in spot markets (whose prices are sensitive to short-term market 
conditions) since long-term contracts use prices indexed on oil products with time-
lagged monthly averages. In particular, the use of financial derivatives or portfolio 
management on forward markets could provide protection against spot market 
volatility while allowing taking advantage of short-term opportunities. However, 
smoothed averages could also benefit the consumer if oil prices were to fall and gas 
spot prices to rise.  
The following arguments were listed in favor of long-term contracts: 
 For the seller, who invests in the exploration, production and construction of pipelines 
or of gas liquefaction facilities, signing a long-term contract is a guarantee on the 
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profitability of the investment. As natural gas transportation is expensive, long-term 
contracts are needed to finance the operations. The seller is taking a price risk as the 
price of the delivered volumes is indexed on oil products whose price is not known ex 
ante (and which guarantees the competitiveness of gas compared to its main 
alternatives), but not a volume risk  (since the volume if secured by the take-or-pay 
clauses). Nevertheless, such system remains advantageous in the context of high oil 
prices. 
 Security of supply is the main advantage of long-term contracts for the purchaser. The 
buyer, however, must also diversify its supply sources in order to gain some flexibility 
from being able to choose between long-term contracts and spot market deliveries 
(stemming for example from the LNG market).  
 Finally, long-term contracts are not necessarily incompatible with the entry of new 
operators provided that the regulator enforces regular gas releases, which oblige 
incumbent suppliers to place a certain amount of imported gas at the disposal of the 
wholesale market.  
3.5. Oil-Indexation in Long-Term Contracts? 
As discussed, oil-indexation in Europe exists mainly for historical reasons: when the 
first pipelines to import gas from Russia and the first liquefaction and regasification facilities 
were built to import gas from Algeria, oil was the most commonly used fossil fuel. Natural 
gas was also extracted as a co-product of oil, which meant that oil exporters were also gas 
exporters. It was not interesting for the gas exporters to encourage competition with oil, 
encouraging price linkages. Furthermore, the two energies are substitutes, which implies a 
degree of logical correlation between the two prices.  
Oil-indexing based gas prices on those of competing alternatives. Such pricing 
mechanism included mathematical formulae linking gas prices to those for other fuels used 
mainly for heating and industrial purposes (such as coal and heavy and  light fuel oil) at a 
discount, thereby ensuring that gas remained competitive with respect to competing fuels. As 
a consequence, gas increased its market share. 
Indexation was built with certain features (mainly to reduce its volatility and to align 
with monthly payment and invoicing methods): indexation formulas including a smoothing 
mechanism in the form of a time differential and a moving monthly average. Furthermore, 
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indexation also has another important quality: it protects purchasers from arbitrary gas price 
increases by producer countries; a gas OPEC would not have significant effects if gas prices 
remained indexed on oil products, which would not be the case in the case of a dominant 
regional European spot markets. 
However, oil-indexation can be seen as impeding the development of a free gas market 
as well as hindering security of supply, preventing the gas price from being set by gas market 
fundamentals. The oil price is considered more likely to increase as reserves decrease and 
demand increases, creating an oil shortage. As the ratio between reserves and production is 
much higher for gas, the validity of maintaining the linkage between abundant gas and 
exhausting oil is brought back into question. Furthermore, new unconventional technologies 
for exploiting both oil and gas reserves mean that such products are no longer extracted as co-
products and the geographical distribution of reserves can differ significantly among the two 
resources. Therefore, one could suggest, and this will be discussed all along this paper, that 
future long-term contracts be signed with spot indexation clauses rather than oil indexation 
(assuming a good degree of flexibility of European gas spot markets).  
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4. COMPETITION AND THE TRANSITION 
TOWARDS HUB-BASED PRICING 
4.1. EU Regulatory Framework 
Percebois (2008) summarizes the EU’s priorities as follows: 
1) Sourcing of the best price for the final consumer via confidence in market mechanisms 
favoring competition 
2) Satisfactory supply security, i.e. diversification of imports and financing of 
investments to develop national energy supply 
3) Promotion of sustainable development, taking into account negative externalities in 
energy access costs, encouraging energy savings and the promotion of renewable 
energies 
Such priorities are the result of an ongoing process towards liberalization and 
competition which had its first beginnings in 2005 when the European Commission launched 
an inquiry into competition in gas and electricity markets. Such inquiry responded to concerns 
by consumers and new entrants in the sector about the insufficient development of wholesale 
gas and electricity markets and the consequent limited choice for consumers. The results, 
published in January 2007, evinced five main problems acting as barriers to competition for 
consumers: 
 Continuing high levels of concentration, causing incumbents to maintain market 
power 
 Barriers to entry deriving from vertical integration, as the monopolists continued to 
own the energy infrastructure; such inadequate level of unbundling between network 
and supply interests had negative repercussions on market functioning as well as 
investment incentives 
 Too little integration between Member States’ markets, as evinced by low levels of 
cross-border trade, due to insufficient interconnector capacity and to contractual 
congestion  as spare physical capacity is not regularly released 
 Lack of transparency about operations in the wholesale energy sector, making it 
difficult for new entrants to understand how the markets work in practice and the risks 
that they imply 
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 Lack of confidence that wholesale energy prices are the result of meaningful 
competition. 
The sector inquiry conclusively demonstrated that the existing regulations were not 
adequate to address the issues above. Claude Turmes, a Luxembourgish politician and 
Member of the European Parliament for Luxembourg's Green Party, part of the European 
Greens, declared in 2002: "Without stricter rules on market dominance and a phase out of the 
existing market distortions in favor of some big players, the European electricity market will 
be dominated by a handful of oligopolies. This is a threat to the functioning of the market and 
the democratic control of a vital public service". Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, declared in a speech at the European Energy Institute in Brussels on the 
19th September 2007, that she identified the following three major problems due to joint 
ownership of network and supply businesses: 
 “First, the fact that there is discrimination in access to infrastructure exerted from 
TSOs towards supply companies. 
 Secondly, there is the issue of information leakage. In some cases the top management 
of the supply branch has access to strategic business information of the transport 
company, either directly or as a result of their presence on the Board. Or on a more 
practical level, e-mails are copied to affiliated companies. In some cases it appears that 
central functions, such as legal advice, are still provided by the group holding 
company to all members of the group, which clearly reduces the scope for objective 
treatment of all market participants by the Transmission System Operator. There are 
therefore limits to how far Chinese Wall arrangements can actually achieve their 
function on the ground. 
 Most importantly, there is the fact that under present structures investment incentives 
are badly distorted. Transmission System Operators’ investment decisions are in 
practice often taken by the group as a whole. For example, the Italian competition 
authority fined ENI for stopping the expansion of the Trans-Tunisian gas pipeline 
proposed by its network business. The investment would have introduced more 
competition in the Italian market, and you can see who would gain and who would 
suffer as a result! In addition, integrated Transmission System Operators have a 
chilling effect for the investment strategy of third parties who will think twice about 
investing if they fear unfair treatment by the network operator.” 
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A. The Third Energy Package  
As an answer to the issues mentioned above, and in line with the revitalizing of the 
Lisbon agenda (a 10-year strategy proposed by the European Commission on 3 March 2010 
for reviving the economy of the European Union via targets on, among others, investments in 
R&D -3% of GDP- , greenhouse gas reduction -20% compared to the levels of 1990-, share of 
renewable energy in final energy consumption -20% increase-, energy efficiency -20% 
increase-, and education), the European Union developed the Third Energy Package for an 
internal gas and electricity market. Its purpose is to further open up the gas and electricity 
markets in the EU to true and effective competition, to the benefits of consumers (businesses 
and households). The package was proposed by the European Commission in September 
2007, adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in July 2009, and 
entered into force on the 3rd of September 2009. After this date, EU Member States had 18 
months to transpose the two Directives (for gas and electricity) into national law. However, 
the complete transposition of the European electricity and gas legislation in all Member States 
is still not complete. Because of this, the Third Internal Energy Market Package was adopted 
in 2009 to accelerate investments in energy infrastructure to enhance cross border trade and 
access to diversified sources of energy. 
The main feature of the third package is third party access, which states that, in order 
to have effective competition the operators of transmission networks must allow any 
electricity or gas supplier non-discriminatory access to the transmission network at regulated 
conditions to avoid any abuse of dominance. Transmission networks, given their structural 
condition of natural monopoly, must be subject to regulation. The rules on unbundling of 
transmission networks aim at preventing companies which are involved both in transmission 
of energy and in production and supply of energy from using their privileged position as 
operators of a transmission network to prevent access of their competitors to such network.  
Member States can decide between three models of unbundling: Ownership 
unbundling, the Independent System Operator (ISO), and the Independent Transmission 
Operator (ITO). Ownership unbundling requires the separation of companies' generation and 
sale operations from their transmission network. Production companies and suppliers are only 
allowed to have minority shareholding, with no voting rights and no appointment of 
administrators. The second and third options to diminish the market power of the biggest 
energy firms are the ISO and the ITO. The ISO gives the opportunity to let the transmission 
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networks remain under the ownership of energy groups, but transferring operation, control, 
maintenance and investment of their business to an ISO (an independent company in the legal 
form of a trustee). Several other countries (among which France, Germany, and Austria) 
presented a proposal for a third option, the ITO. Such model envisages energy companies 
retaining ownership of their transmission networks, but the transmission subsidiaries would 
be legally independent joint stock companies operating under their own brand name, under a 
strictly autonomous management and under stringent regulatory control, while investment 
decisions would be made jointly by the parent company and the regulatory authority. 
Finally, the third energy package instituted high standards of public service obligations 
and customer protection (such as provisions enabling customers to switch suppliers within 
three weeks and obligations on suppliers to provide information to consumers), stronger 
powers and independence of national regulators (together with the creation of the Agency for 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, and the European Network of Transmission System 
operators), as well as new tools to harmonize market and network operation at a pan-
European level (common principles in order to facilitate cross-border trade and reduce 
transaction costs).  
Importantly, such legislative package also addressed the issue of supply of security by 
defining conditions of energy solidarity in emergency situations, requiring Member States to 
co-operate in the event of "severe disruptions" of gas supply, by coordinating national 
emergency measures and developing electricity and gas interconnections. 
Percebois (2008) highlights the following relevant distinction between the effect of the 
reforms on the gas and power industries: “A fundamental point must be highlighted when it is 
a question of natural gas prices formation. Market opening wished for by Brussels does not 
concern the foreign companies that supply the EU as neither Gazprom or Sonatrach […] are 
affected by European directives. This is the major difference between the gas and electricity 
industries. Most of the upstream part of the gas production chain escapes Brussels’ influence, 
and market opening should not weaken importers confronted by foreign suppliers who are 
generally government owned companies anyway. […] Gas rent is largely in the producers 
hands today, which is also the case in the oil sector.” 
However, such ownership unbundling could run the risk of leading to a situation in 
which transmission networks are bought and controlled by companies outside of Europe, such 
as Sonatrach or Gazprom.  
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Also, in many EU states regulated tariffs have had a deterring impact on the 
development of competitive markets since they have been set at low levels and cover most of 
the potential retail market.  
B. The Ten Projects of European Interest 
Concerning transnational gas pipelines, the Commission had selected ten projects of 
European interest mainly financed by project finance (European Commission, 2006), meaning 
that projects are financed by a separate project company acting as a joint venture of energy 
and transmission companies Such projects were all defined as of European interest because of 
their cross-border nature. Such projects are the following: 
 North Stream, connecting Russia to Germany. Maximum discharge 55 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) per year. To be completed in October 2012. 
 Yamal-Europe pipeline, connecting natural gas fields in Western Siberia and (in the 
future) Yamal Peninsula to Austria (Baumgarten Gas Hub) and Germany. Maximum 
discharge: 33 bcm/year. Completed in 2005; since 2005, building the second leg of the 
pipeline has been subject to planning. However, in November 2007, the Russian 
minister of industry and energy Viktor Khristenkosaid stated that Russia had 
abandoned such project in favor of the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline.  
 Baltic Gas Interconnector, which was a project of submarine pipelines between 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden connecting the existing pipeline networks of southern 
Scandinavian and Continental European countries. The pipeline was scheduled to 
come online in 2005. However, after receiving delayed authorizations from the 
Swedish and Danish governments, the project is still waiting for the authorization 
from the German government, and has not been implemented yet. Gas was planned to 
be transported from the North Sea which is now in depletion. As a consequence, 
Russian gas has been considered as an alternative source for the pipeline. However, 
the BGI is being reconsidered due to considerations about linking North Stream to the 
Swedish pipeline network. Maximum discharge: 3 bcm/year. 
 Increase in transmission capacity on the Germany — Belgium — United Kingdom 
axis. 
 Expansion of the TransMed, a natural gas pipeline from Algeria via 
Tunisia to Sicily and thence to mainland Italy. A third line spanning 550km was built 
in March 2010 to carry natural gas from the Hassi R'Mel gas field to Tunisian border 
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where it is coursed into the Transmed pipeline. A 35km-long extension line was also 
constructed from Italian Mainland to Slovenia. It has the capacity to deliver 30.2bcm/y 
(billion cubic meters per annum) of natural gas. Its capacity will be increased to 
33.5bcm/y by 2012. 
 Algeria-Italy gas pipeline, via Sardinia and Corsica, with a branch to France (GALSI). 
The pipeline is expected to become operational in 2014. Maximum discharge: 10 
bcm/year. 
 Medgas gas pipeline (Algeria — Spain — France — Continental Europe), linking 
Algeria to Spain. Inaugurated on the 1st of March 2011. Maximum discharge: 8 
bcm/year. 
 Turkey — Greece — Italy gas pipeline, linking the Greek and Turkish gas grids. 
Inaugurated on the 18th of November 2007. Maximum discharge: 11 bcm/year. 
 The Nabucco pipeline, also known as the Turkey — Austria gas pipeline, 
linking Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der 
March in Austria diversifying natural gas suppliers as well as delivery routes for 
Europe, thereby diminishing European dependence on Russian energy. The project is 
backed by the European Union and the United States and is seen as rivaling 
the Gazprom-Eni South Stream project. The main supplier is expected to be Iraq with 
potential additions from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Egypt. An intergovernmental 
agreement between Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria in preparation 
for the construction was signed in July 2009. If built, the pipeline is expected, as of 
today, to be operational in 2017. Maximum discharge: 31 bcm/year. 
 The Greenstream pipeline (or Libya-Italy gas pipeline) linking Libya to Italy. 
Inaugurated in 2004, it has a maximum discharge of 11 bcm/year. 
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Figure 23: Russian Gas Corridors to Europe - North Stream, Yamal & Brotherhood (Source: The 
Economist) 
 
Figure 24: Gas Pipelines across Mediterranean and Sahara & Nabucco Pipeline Project (Source: 
Wikipedia and The Economist) 
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4.2. Oil and Gas in a European Perspective 
A. Europe’s Energy Mix 
In Europe, as the following charts illustrate, natural gas (gradually following on long 
trend) and renewable energies (rapidly but more recently) have increased their share of the 
total primary energy supply. In particular, natural gas’ consumption growth has surpassed 
(largely in the 1960s and 1970s, steadily in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s) the one of oil. Oil 
appears to have entered a steady downwards trend in European consumption over the past 15 
years, despite an increasing total primary energy consumption; natural gas’ consumption 
development for the time being is harder to characterize, and appears to have become more 
volatile as the recession hit in 2008. 
 
Figure 25: Evolution of the EU 27's Primary Energy Supply (Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2012) 
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Figure 26: EU 27 Oil & Gas Consumption Growth (Source: Author's elaboration on data of the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
According to Stern et al. (2011), the elimination of oil from many stationary energy 
sectors, the inconvenience of maintaining oil-burning equipments and related oil stocks, the 
emergence of modern gas-burning equipment and the tightening environmental standards all 
have contributed to question the validity of the linkage of long-term contract prices to those of 
oil products.  
B. Import and Hub Prices in Europe 
After 2008, as Europe entered a prolonged phase of economic depression, a gap 
formed between oil-linked import prices and European hub prices, as illustrated in the chart 
below (generating a “two-price” or “hybrid” market). Oil-linked prices have been 
nevertheless defended by producers with market power; gas producers have also put forward 
that no other appropriate price mechanism is available, as European hubs are considererd too 
illiquid and prone to manipulation by local players. On the other hand, abandoning oil-linked 
prices generates fears of price manipulation by exporters such as Gazprom as well as of a 
potential creation of a “gas OPEC”. Finally, it has been commonly expected that such prices 
would recouple (i.e. return to the same level) by 2012. 
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Figure 27: German Oil-Linked Contract and Border Prices and NBP Prices (Euro/MWh) (Source: Stern 
et al. 2011) 
Figure 27 shows three time series: the NBP (National Balancing Point – the UK hub) 
monthly average spot prices, the German border average monthly price (which is the only 
transparent and official price available for oil-linked import contracts) as well as the “German 
contract”, i.e. the purchase price in oil-linked long term contracts mainly with Gazprom, 
Statoil and Gasterra. Interestingly, the BAFA price appears to de-couple from the “German 
border” price: this is due to the fact that the EU importers, using the price signal given by 
European hubs, successfully negotiated a new discounted price level for imports, which took 
effect in the summer of 2009. 
Prices in long term import contracts are generally reset quarterly based on the 
evolution of the average of oil prices on the preceding 6 to 9 months (often with additional 
time lags). Traditional European gas renegotiations were held thanks to price review clauses, 
according to which the components determining the price level (the base price and the 
indexation formula) could be periodically renegotiated on the basis of evolving country-
specific conditions such as the GDP growth rate, inflation, prices of competing fuels and so 
on.  
Hence, the evolution of the price in long term imports is rigid by construction. After 
2008, such rigidities became particularly painful for European importers as the recession hit 
Europe and hub prices tumbled. Furthermore, as natural gas markets become more integrated 
internationally and “globalize”, movements in supply and demand as well as prices in other 
areas have a much more immediate impact on European gas prices. The chart below illustrates 
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how the economic crisis as well as differently evolving supply and demand balances in 
different areas has brought commodity prices to follow diverging paths.  
 
Figure 28: Natural Gas Prices (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012) 
Examples of diverging supply and demand conditions since 2008 are:  
 The 2008-09 global recession (especially important for Europe). 
 The collapse and quick substantial recovery of LNG demand in Asia (particularly in 
the established LNG markets of Japan, Korea and Taiwan) while demand in the new 
markets of China and India was significantly less influenced by recession. 
 The rapid development of shale gas production in North America (with a consequent 
substantial fall in Henry Hub prices), effectively isolating the North American market 
from the rest of the world. 
 Fluctuations in international coal prices and their impact on gas demand. 
 Finally, fluctuations in power and carbon prices leading to fluctuations in spark and 
dark spreads (spark spreads represent the theoretical gross margin of a gas-fired power 
plant, whereas dark spreads represent the theoretical gross margin of a coal-fired 
power plant). 
The following trends could halt a transition away from oil indexation:  
 A European economic recovery sufficient to bring back energy and gas demand to its 
2007 levels. 
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 US prices would have to rise above NBP prices, diverting LNG away from Europe, 
which seems unlikely to happen. 
 Asian LNG demand would have to rise significantly, again taking away surplus LNG 
from the European markets (this is partially happening as a consequence of a the 
terrible earthquake which hit Japan in March 2011, causing it to close 11 GW of 
nuclear generation). 
 Further technical or political delays in LNG supplies (particularly, for example, 
increasing domestic demand in countries like Algeria and Egypt). 
 A prolonged fall in oil prices to close the gap between hub prices and long term prices 
 An insufficient development of liquidity at market hubs, as well as a permanent 
market power of dominant suppliers and buyers, maintaining the pricing and 
contractual status quo (Stern et al., 2011: “Liquidity increased at all the European 
market hubs and, due to improvements in third party access, competition increased 
and the market power of incumbents declined”). 
 Cold weather patterns absorbing the European oversupply.  
Looking at a longer-term horizon, additional gas supplies to Europe markets may be 
limited due to: 
 Lack of expansion in exports from North Africa, mainly due to increasing domestic 
demand in countries such Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
 Lack of substantial contribution from Middle East and Caspian (e.g. from 
Turkmenistan) supplies to Europe. 
 Lack of substantial development in domestic unconventional gas production to replace 
declining conventional gas production. 
 Uncertainty concerning the scale and timing of new global LNG supplies from key 
countries such as Nigeria, Qatar, Australia, Venezuela and Iran. 
However, sources of additional European gas supply could be:  
 Increasing LNG supplies principally from Qatar (which will however be subject to 
increasing global competition). 
 Russian supplies, seen as undesirable because of security reasons related to transit 
(principally through Ukraine and Byelorussia) and political manipulation. 
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 A falling demand due to the introduction renewable energy sources as well as an 
increase in energy efficiency could also act as a limitation to additional import 
requirements. 
Stern et al. (2011) clearly state that such multitude of influences is the reason why a 
structurally rigid import price, indexed on a commodity different than the one it is pricing, is 
not sustainable: “The proponents of the “status quo”, (i.e. those unwilling to countenance 
replacing the current oil-linked pricing with an alternative formula), claim that there are too 
many new parameters – which are changing too quickly and unpredictably – to construct an 
alternative index which will be sufficiently stable while reflecting changing market conditions 
over time. On the contrary, in a world where LNG connects regions and Europe’s gas market 
fundamentals are impacted by events on other continents, the need for a price formation 
mechanism which responds rapidly to such changes is becoming crucial. This is why – with 
all of their imperfections […] – the emerging European gas hubs provide the best indicator of 
a market price which long term contracts increasingly need to reflect. In other words we 
believe the co-existence of oil-linked and hub-based pricing is unsustainable and that the latter 
is the best available indicator of supply and demand conditions in the gas market”.  
4.3. The Progress in Hub-based Pricing 
With the unbundling of the transmission networks, the transmission infrastructure has 
become akin to a public transport medium whose purpose is to offer all market participants 
third-party access to a virtual trading place. Such developments have hindered the market 
dominance of the incumbent importers. Nowadays, market participants have to pay a fee for 
the use of the transmission network within its entry and exit points. Such points delineate 
regional markets, while (regional) prices are set in a virtual trading exchange. 
The following figure, showing the development of volumes traded at natural gas hubs 
(the rest being supplied via bilateral agreements outside the hubs), illustrate the fact that 
trading at European hubs has made considerable progress.  
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Figure 29: Development of Traded Volumes of Continental European Gas Hubs 2003-2009 (Source: 
IEA, Medium Term Oil and Gas Markets, 2010, IEW WEO, p. 207) 
However, questions remain as to whether such hubs have sufficient liquidity to be 
regarded as acceptable price discovery mechanisms. The churn ratio (i.e. the ratio of traded 
volume to physical consumption through the grid TSO) for none of the Continental European 
hubs is greater than 5 (a market is conventionally considered to be liquid if it has a churn ratio 
greater than a minimum of 10). However, the estimates of the churn ratio for the NBP in the 
UK are between 15 and 19. On the other hand, as long as European hubs maintain an 
essentially balancing role (this aspect will be discussed further below) it will be very 
challenging to predict prices; this is likely to hinder the growth of the churn ratios. 
Interestingly, addressing this matter, Mr. Komlev, Head of Contract Structuring and Price 
Formation at Gazprom Export, stated this year that (Komlev, 2012) “on the Continent the 
available financial instruments usually offer hedging opportunities that are limited in duration 
to only six to nine months. It is no coincidence that the maturity of forward instruments 
equates to a base period in the long-term supply contract formulas. Prices of long-term 
contracts for oil-indexed formulas are usually quite predictable”. 
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Figure 30: Churn Ratio at European Hubs (Source: Konlev, 2012) 
Furthermore, European gas spot prices across different countries and market areas do 
not exhibit so far any significant divergence suggesting that they might be subject to 
manipulation. The divergence is even lesser on forward maturities. Moreover, as hubs gain 
additional participants and increase their liquidity, the potential for manipulation will 
decrease. On the other hand, the problem of the oligopolistic nature of European gas markets, 
where few buyers confront with few sellers thereby leaving significant potential for 
manipulation, remains. Sellers view EU liberalization as a reduction of their security of 
demand and their rents from gas sales, while buyers suspect sellers or preparing a gas OPEC.  
It is also a natural consequence of the globalization process as well as of the 
multiplication of influences on European gas prices that hub based prices are likely to 
substantially increase volatility. On the very short-term, increased price volatility is a 
consequence of the need to balance the market. However, such volatility might not necessarily 
be passed to final customers, as suppliers segment the market: small and medium sized 
customers will not necessarily be exposed to daily or monthly changes, as suppliers will use 
trading strategies to reduce volatility and smooth the price pattern for smaller customers. 
Larger customers will most likely have in-house trading capabilities to optimize their own 
portfolios. 
Furthermore, the growth of hub-based pricing in North West Europe is likely to have a 
strong impact on other European countries; such impact will be intensified by growing and 
diversified LNG supplies as well as increasing pipeline interconnections with bi-directional 
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flows within the EU. Stern et al. (2011) clearly underline this statement: “By 2013, pipeline 
interconnections will allow LNG arriving in Greece to be delivered to a range of south and 
central European countries as far north as Austria; or vice-versa for gas to be delivered from 
the CEGH hub to Greece. While in central and south east Europe these developments are still 
unfolding, it seems unlikely that any country would wish to remain, and will remain, excluded 
from the possibility of accessing attractively priced gas from a greater variety of sources. This 
will be an environment in which hub-based pricing will thrive”.  
The switch to hub-based pricing entailed a fundamental change of mindset for 
traditional buyers, from a mindset proper of an actor of a relatively captive market, to one 
which reflects the competitive environment of access to liquid gas markets. Traditional long 
term contracts represented a secure source of supply, and prices could be passed on to the 
end-users. Higher prices than those at the newborn hubs could be justified by the volume 
flexibility embedded in such contracts (typically between 80% and 120% of annual contract 
quantity) as it allowed buyers to vary their off take depending on their possibility to use other 
forms of flexibility (such as gas in storage) and, of course, the level of demand from the 
consumers. Indeed, sources of flexibility are the storages (which are continuously growing in 
Europe) as well as hub trading and, potentially, short-term LNG supplies. In a trading 
environment, an oil-indexed contract represents a future potential exposure and a source of 
rigidity. It is interesting to note that, even if the spread between oil-indexed prices and hub 
prices is reduced, such rigidity (future exposure) in an increasingly uncertain global gas 
system is likely to remain considered as a threat. As gas trading grows, take-or-pay conditions 
and contractual flexibility become of secondary importance since operators are given the 
opportunity to buy and sell short-term gas to balance their portfolios. This highlights the 
importance for buyers to develop alternative sources of supply and flexibility. 
4.4. Long-term Import Price Review and Arbitration 
European long-term import gas contracts typically contain an arbitration clause: such 
clause declares that, if a disagreement between the parties should occur, a decision (binding 
on both parties) will be requested from an arbitral tribunal. For example, if the dispute 
concerns the price, the arbitral tribunal will have to set a price whose application will be 
backdated to the beginning of the legal proceedings. This represents a process whose outcome 
is highly uncertain. Nevertheless, starting in the late 2000s, the frequency with which 
arbitrations were reported in the press has increased. 
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Such gradual process of transition away from oil-linked pricing in long term import 
contracts does not automatically hinder the existence of such contracts. However, if hub-
based pricing becomes predominant in Europe, sellers will ask themselves what remaining 
purpose is being served by long term export contracts. Traditionally, such framework allowed 
sellers to rely on the legal obligation of gas buyers to take a minimum volume of gas at an oil-
linked price. As sellers were not granted access to downstream markets, they relied on their 
buyers’ access to a large customer base and sufficient market power to ensure and defend 
such price level. However, as discussed above, competition and third party access in 
European gas markets mean that oil-linked prices can no longer be forced by utilities on their 
customers (as third party access implies that buying gas at hub-based prices has become 
accessible for most final customers). Therefore, if sellers receive hub prices from buyers 
under a long term contractual arrangement, there will be practically no difference with the 
price they could get by themselves selling directly to end-customers (via third party access).  
Therefore, the arbitration and renegotiation of contracts could cause sellers to decide 
that they can obtain similar, if not greater, value by selling the gas directly to end-customers. 
If this is the case, transitioning to hub-based pricing is therefore likely to be associated with a 
termination of existing long term contracts.  Probably not all existing contracts will be 
terminated; it seems quite likely that the different operators will develop a portfolio of 
contracts, including long-term, medium-term and spot pricing. The main characteristics of the 
new framework are likely to be a greater degree of flexibility, smaller volumes and shorter 
lengths than in the preceding contractual framework. 
4.5. A Hybrid Pricing Model for Europe? 
Is there really a reason why oil-indexed and hub-based prices cannot continue their 
historic relationship in a synergistic fashion? Would it be suitable for an import-dependent 
market like Europe to move towards a purely hub-based short-term pricing model, similar to 
the one existing in the United States? Sergei Komlev, Head of Contract Structuring and Price 
Formation at Gazprom Export, discusses these (semmingly provocative) questions in a very 
interesting article published on the European Energy Review on the 7th of May 2012. His 
main point is that such a short-term model would leave Europe at the mercy of market forces, 
which do not necessarily deliver security of supply. From Mr. Komlev’s point of view, the 
current hybrid pricing system is of value to Europe, in that it possesses the virtues of ensuring 
security of supply while providing at the same time a framework for competition and 
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flexibility (i.e. adaptability to the EU’s supply and demand balance). Both systems are seen in 
fact as complementing each other in the current market conditions, as different types of risks 
will determine ad hoc choices of contracting and pricing conditions.  
According to Mr. Komlev, “existing long-term contracts are especially designed for 
oil-indexation”. If a switch to hub-indexation were to occur in long-term contracts, the seller 
would remain burdened with the obligation to deliver gas while having no means of 
controlling its selling price. On the other hand, sufficiently liquid hubs would provide a 
substitute for long-term contract obligations. As discussed above, however, a shift to hub-
pricing would put into question the need for long-term contractual agreements. Furthermore, 
in a context of dynamic change actors become mostly interested in optimizing their own 
business and strive for greater efficiency within their own segment. This however also implies 
the loss of redundancy and spare capacity in the supply system, whose importance could be 
non-negligible in the event of a crisis. Gas suppliers have an interest in scarcity, which 
implies that the market alone will not ensure security of supply.  
It has to be noted that, for the time being, hub pricing on the European continent is not 
the result of total supply and demand, but rather the result of a supply-demand equilibrium 
(influenced by balancing and arbitrage –between pricing structures and between hubs) within 
residual volumes that are left once long-term contract have met the bulk of demand. In the 
current hybrid pricing model, European hub prices are not the result of the aggregate supply 
and demand balance, but rather act as an indicator of the hybrid system’s status of over or 
undersupply. Mr. Komlev states that, “in contrast to North American hubs, hubs in the hybrid 
pricing model do not provide a true indication of the supply-demand balance but only a fake 
imitation of it. But the hub price is a perfect instrument of all kinds of arbitrage, a role 
delegated to it by the hybrid model”. 
Mr. Komlev then continues to address the reasons that justify having long-term oil-
indexed prices at a higher level than spot prices: 
 As discussed above, a major reason for such price difference is the value of flexibility 
provided by long-term pipeline supplies. 
 Furthermore, balancing on hubs tends to have a “one-sided” characteristic: in case of 
undersupply, existing long-term arrangements will likely ensure additional deliveries 
at a cost which is more convenient than other sources. On the other hand, in case of 
oversupply, selling gas on the hubs is a “quick-fix”. 
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On the other hand, spot prices have increased, historically, above long-term import 
prices (such as in the month of February of 2012 due to a record cold snap); this however 
appears to be more the result of a capacity problem on the European gas infrastructure at a 
time of great stress. The more such infrastructure is developed, the less probable such 
occasions are likely to become.  
Broadly speaking, competition enhancement policy might run the risk of putting a 
group of market players which do not import gas to Europe under long-term arrangement and 
are not responsible for gas storage but rather source their gas on the spot markets in an 
advantageous position with respect to incumbent importing companies. This creates a power 
shift hindering the possibility for importers to renegotiate prices with producers in the light of 
the new market situation; big exporters, such as Gazprom, now have to deal with smaller 
partners with less leverage and market capitalization. As Europe becomes increasingly 
import-dependent, oil-indexations can be considered a protection from price manipulations, as 
none of the main suppliers is able to influence the price of oil.  
Furhtermore, as discussed in the Harvard University’s scenarios above, big exporters 
might be unwilling, in the long run, to remain dependent on the European market, as Asia 
appears to be headed towards significant growth rates. Also, as climatic issues become 
increasingly pressing, gas might be reduced to a niche role of transitional fuel, thereby 
effectively creating a situation of unknown demand. In a long-term business like gas, the 
possiblity to forecast future demand is necessary for  investments to be made in gas fields and 
infrastructure. Demand insecurity halts the diversification processes while undermining 
relationships with traditional producers. 
According to Ms. Kirsten Westphal, Senior Researcher at the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (Westphal, 2012): “A mix of commercial contacts and long-
term contracts - the latter now being discouraged by legislation – appears a judicious way to 
provide basic quantities for the market at predictable prices and thus limit volatility. That 
would also restrict the possibilities for big gas producers to influence prices and quantities. 
With the international gas market dominated by an oligopoly the possibility of price-fixing 
cannot be ruled out, especially where producers are beyond the regulatory and judicial reach 
of the EU”. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As stated in the first section, natural gas can be used for heating, cooking, producing 
electricity, transportation, and as an industrial feedstock. It is in competition with oil, coal, 
hydro, nuclear and renewable energy in terms of share of the world's primary energy mix. 
Percentagewise, natural gas has been steadily increasing its share of the world primary energy 
mix over the last decades. Such trend has been recently (starting in the late 1990s) 
accompanied by a similar dynamic from renewable energy (however,the growth of alternative 
sources has been at an increasing pace). Coal's share has also recently picked up again, mostly 
as a consequence of the unconventional gas exploitation in North America which has shifted 
most of the US demand for coal towards natural gas and thereby created an oversupply of coal 
and tumbling prices. Such developments have been mostly at the expense of oil's share 
withing the world's primary energy mix. Oil's falling share is being compensated for by coal, 
gas and renewable energy, as well as by a general increase in the energy efficiency (i.e. 
decreasing energy intensity) of the economy. Such evolving picture is being further modeled 
by the technological developments which have allowed the exploitation of unconventional gas 
sources. 
Internationally, natural gas production is dominated by Russia and the United States, 
which together account for 40% of the world's production. The distribution of the production 
and consumption across the 10 regional areas defined in this paper shows that the EU 27 and  
Asia clearly exhibit a strong import dependency, while the Rest of Europe, the Former Soviet 
Union, the Middle East and Africa all exhibit a greater production than consumption. On the 
other hand, North America, South America, Eurasia and Oceania are all roughly balanced. 
This explains the distribution of trade flows from surplus areas to deficit areas.  
From an historical perspective, the production of natural gas has been on an increasing 
trend over the last 2 decades (to the least) in all regions with the exception of Europe, where it 
appears to have peaked and has been constantly decreasing since the first half of the 2000s, 
and the Former Soviet Union, where it has remained generally flat. The evolution is similar 
for consumption, with the slight difference that Europe's decrease in consumption is taking 
place at a lesser pace. 
In terms of proved reserves, the landscape is vastly dominated by Eurasia, the Former 
Soviet Union and the Middle East, which are therefore likely to acquire an ever increasing 
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role in the global natural gas trade. Africa and South America as well as (interestingly) Asia 
are well endowed with reserves if compared to their annual consumption. This therefore 
leaves, over the mediumg to long term (3 to 10 years) only one major deficit area, both in 
terms of current annual consumption versus current annual production and proved reserves: 
the EU 27. 
Furthermore, proved reserves are, for the time being, concentrated for 76% in the 
Middle East (38%), the Former Soviet Union (22%) as well as Eurasia (14%). This might, 
over the medium to long term, place some market power within the hands of the producing 
countries of these areas. However, the creation of a gas cartel appears, at current conditions, 
unlikely: the global market for natural gas is fragmented (such areas encompass many 
countries), natural gas has serveal substitues as it is used primarily for electricity generation 
and heating, and most natural gas remains shipped through a regional network of international 
pipelines. If, on the other hand, natural gas liberalization and hub liquidity were to greatly 
improve in Europe, and the international LNG spot market were to increase considerably, the 
conditions could be set for a defensive reaction from the main natural gas producers.  
The picture described above might be substantially revolutionized by the worldwide 
development of unconventional natural gas exploitation: given today's total world 
consumption, such development could increase the R/P ratio worldwide from 65 to roughly 
120 years. Such exploitation is for the time being limited to North America, and is broadly 
opposed in Europe due to the environmental concerns it generates. Also, Europe's shale 
deposits appear harder to extract and its gas industry is faced with more regulations as well as 
with a less developed pipeline network than North America. Unconventional gas exlpoitation 
could, however, represent a radical change for Europe, in two aspects: reduce its import 
dependency (the EU's R/P would be roughly tripled if technically recoverable unconventional 
reserves were to become proven reserves) as well as split the producers' market power (since 
such resource is vastly distributed wordlwide). 
In terms of trade, the EU and Asia are the main import areas. The majority of imports 
in Europe are via pipeline (LNG, however, accounts for roughly 1/3 of EU net imports), 
whereas Asia's imports are for the vast majority via LNG vessels. Pipeline trade supplies 
adjacent markets, while LNG trade supplies distant markets. In 2011, the total LNG traded 
volumes accounted for roughly 10% of the world's total consumption. The same spot/long-
term trades split existing for pipeline volumes also exists on the LNG market. On this market, 
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roughly 25% is traded spot (i.e. for short term deliveries, typically within a few months). 
Also, due to such rigidities, LNG volumes cannot be easily and efficiently arbitraged. Hence, 
it is important to underline that the growth of the LNG market does not automatically entail a 
"gas price globalization": the focus here should be on the growth of the LNG spot market, as 
well as on the development of mechanisms facilitating LNG arbitrage (such as global LNG 
trading platforms and standardization, both technical and contractual). Of course, a growing 
LNG market is likely to imply a greater LNG spot market and more arbitrage possibilities; 
this is however not a necessary implication (for example, if the global gas market were to 
tighten, LNG arbitrage would be hampered as security of supply would prevail).  
The discussion above allows listing the following key developments of international 
gas dynamics and their impact on EU hub trading growth. They aim at being as mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive as possible. They variables can then be organized in a 
framework according to their relevance for the EU’s price level (EU supply/demand 
imbalance) and for global price convergence. The variables are the following 
a. Strong Asian consumption surplus: it is likely to tighten the global gas market; 
Asian and European prices are likely to converge, while additional exports 
become more likely to come to the market (hence, a high impact on the EU’s 
price level, with an indirect effect on global price convergence as Asia and the 
EU enter a tighter competition).  
b. Strong EU consumption surplus: if the recent decline will be temporary, 
increasing demand might put pressure on hub prices; on the short term this 
might lock the EU within its import system and potentially realign hub prices 
with long-term import prices, thereby hindering hub liquidity growth; however, 
on the longer term, such development is likely to emphasize the natural gas' 
market supply/demand dynamics and render the EU market more dependent on 
the global supply/demand balance (a high impact on the EU’s price level, with 
an indirect effect on global price convergence as Asia and the EU enter a 
tighter competition).  
c. Strong development of unconventional gas production within the EU; it is 
likely to have a strong (downwards) price level impact as well as a strong boost 
to hub liquidity (following the EU's guidelines); on the other hand, the impact 
on global price convergence might be low as markets might remain 
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nevertheless relatively separated; nevertheless, the impact on hub development 
would certainly be favourable as it would reduce the exporters' market power.  
d. Strong development of unconventional gas production outside the EU; it is 
likely to have a strong indirect (downwards) price level impact on the EU; on 
the other hand, it might not necessarily reduce the EU's dependency on long-
term imports; furthermore, the impact on global price convergence might be 
low as markets might remain nevertheless relatively separated; hence, such 
development is likely to have a strong price impact on the EU while 
maintaining a relative/weak impact on EU liquidity as well as on global price 
convergence (due to infrastructure rigidity and long-term sales arrangements). 
e. Development of a deeply interconnected EU pipe network: this would strongly 
promote a favourable environment for trading as well as security of supply; on 
the other hand, the impact both on the EU price level as well as on global price 
convergence is likely to be secondary.  
f. Strong growth of the LNG spot market as well as of LNG arbitrage 
opportunities: these are the most powerful catalyzers of a global gas price 
convergence; on the impact on Europe's price level is also likely to be strong as 
regional supply/demand imbalances will interact on a much vaster scale.  
g. EU supply diversification: the impact on the EU's price level is likely to be low 
(supply diversification, in itself, does not affect the supply/demand balance); 
however, the impact on global price convergence seems likely to be strong. 
If we look at figure 31, the relative importance of these variables defines different 
roles for EU hubs, particularly in the light of their dualism with long term import 
arrangements. Variables a. b. c. and d. point towards the development of regional markets; 
variable e. in itself, all other conditions being equal, merely foster regional balancing markets 
(if, however, local supply/demand imbalances increase, such variable represents key 
infrastructure for the creation of regional markets); variable f. is the strongest catalyzer for the 
creation of a global market; finally, variable g. points towards the creation of interconnected 
global markets whose  relevance however remains in the shadow of long-term sales 
arrangements. Hence, most scenarios indicate the creation of regional markets rapidly reacting 
to supply/demand imbalances. However, even in the case of the development of volatile 
regional markets, the case remains for security of supply demands by Europe (implying oil 
indexation as a protection from price manipulation) accompanied by security of demand 
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concerns of exporters. Key to a complete move towards hub pricing in Europe will therefore 
be both the EU’s diverisification of supply as well as the exporters’ diversification of exports 
(e.g. Russia moving volumes towards Asia). To get globalized markets a strong growth in 
LNG spot volumes and LNG arbitrage possibilities is necessary. 
 
Figure 31: The Role of European Hubs in Different Global Scenarios (Source: Author’s model) 
Within such evolving and uncertain context, the EU's position appears quite delicate, 
as it runs the risk of remaining locked in a regional import system if LNG supplies are drained 
by an increasing Asian demand. Traditionally, the  EU has protected its supply security via 
long-term agreements with its main import sources indexed on oil. This allowed to make 
heavy investments in infrastructure and ensured that volumes would be delivered while at the 
same time removing the seller's possibility to control the price (as it was indexed on another 
commodity). As the EU's consumption grows, such long term contracts started to represent 
entry barriers hindering competition (as they limit the development of spot markets which can 
represent a supply source for alternative suppliers). Furthermore, oil-indexation can be seen as 
hindering security of supply as it prevents the gas price from being set by gas market 
fundamentals. 
The European Union reacted to this situation of increasing uncertainty by promoting 
an energy policy based on the development of market mechanisms which would ensure the 
best price for the final customer, diversifying imports and financing investment to develop 
national energy supply, and finally promoting sustainable development. This was formalized 
by the selection of the Ten Projects of European Interest in 2006 and the Third Energy 
Package in 2007. However, a key point here is to highlight the main difference between the 
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gas and electricity markets, namely the fact that most of the upstream part of the gas chain is 
outside of the EU; market opening therefore runs the risk of weakening importers. This has 
notably been the case since the start of the depression in the EU, which has led to regional hub 
prices traded at a discount with respect to the long-term import prices. It has to be noted, 
however, that a major reason for such price difference is the value of the flexibility provided 
by long-term pipeline supplies (i.e. buyers can typically purchase within 80% or 120% 
percent of the contracted volumes without having to pay penalties, whereas volumes bought 
on hubs have to be traded on short-term markets to adjust for consumption's profile). Also, 
balancing tends to have a one-sided characteristic, as undersupply is typically dealt with by 
sourcing via the long-term arrangements, whereas oversupply typically entails selling 
volumes on the hubs. 
In a world where LNG connects regions and in which the fundamentals of the 
European gas markets are impacted by events in other continents, the need for an efficient 
pricing mechanism is becoming ever more important. As EU sourcing diversification 
improves and as the internal pipeline network develops, contractual flexibility becomes of 
secondary importance as operators are given the possibility to buy and sell short-term gas to 
balance their portfolio. Furthermore, security of supply is fostered as gas can choose one of 
many routes to arrive to its destination. These developments are likely to create an 
environment in which hub trading will thrive. Transitioning towards hub pricing could also 
cause sellers to decide that they can obtain similar or greater value by selling gas directly to 
end users, thereby effectively hindering the existence of long-term contractual agreements. On 
the other hand, in a liberalized market gas suppliers have an interest in scarcity, as it entails 
higher prices, which implies the loss of redundancy and spare capacity in the supply system, 
and therefore the fact that the market alone cannot ensure security of supply. 
To conclude and answer the research question, the global natural gas market is 
affected by a multitude of variables. To anlayze the effect of these variables on the EU's 
pricing structure, it is important to understand the nature and the effect of each one of them. 
For the time being, the EU's future is very uncertain. Supply/demand shocks might provoke 
important shifts in price level. However, the relative role of the European hubs might remain 
limited if Europe's dependency on imports does not decrease. Over the medium term the 
present hybrid pricing system appears maintainable, as well as prudent: it ensures security of 
supply while guaranteeing competition and volume flexibility. Also, it limits the producer's 
capability to influence prices via oil-indexation. For the time being, the most adviseable 
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appears to be the hybrid model. Hence, whether hubs will become the only price signal in 
Europe strongly depends on the extent to which, in the future, global supply/demand 
imbalances foster LNG trades as well as on the EU's diversification of its supply mix. In 
short, EU hub growth strongly depends on the globalization of natural gas markets.  
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